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I
INTRODUCTION
The avoidance of problems raised by the conflict of laws is a crucial facet of the
estate planner's work that can effectively be dealt with in a variety of ways. Because
most estate planning results in the execution of testamentary instruments, however,
this article will concentrate upon the use of the will as a conflict-avoidance device;
although it will also discuss some instances in which the post-mortem operation of
inter vivos transactions creates significant conflicts problems as well as some problems
of intestate succession where necessary to indicate the alternatives present in a plan-
ning situation-but, since planning seldom includes an intentional intestacy, these
latter instances will be limited. Moreover, since troublesome conflicts problems
can arise in administration after the death of the estate owner, techniques for avoid-
ing or alleviating these problems, too, will be treated. The article, thus, will con-
sider conflict avoidance in succession planning in three principal divisions: execution
and revocations of wills, dispositive provisions, and administration of decedents'
estates.
The background of general conflicts law relating to succession, against which all
planning must occur, is fairly simple to state but occasionally complicated in applica-
tion. In the Anglo-American system of common law, succession to immovables is
determined, in the first instance, by the law of the situs of the asset, usually the loca-
tion of the land;' succession to movables and incorporeal assets is regulated by the
law of the owner's domicile at the time of his death In the absence of statute, this
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general approach prevails whether the decedent died testate or intestate.3 Statutory
enactments have, however, in particular instances, altered this approach by providing
different or alternative results,4 and the significance of these enactments will be
discussed as they arise in context.
Most civil-law countries, on the other hand, apply a single or unitary law to all
assets of the deceased. This unitary approach is based on the Roman-law concept
of universal succession and requires the application of the law of either the country
of which the decedent was a national5 or that in which he had his domicile or resi-
dence at the time of his death.6 Several civil-law countries, however, draw a dis-
tinction between immovables and movables, applying the law of the situs to the
former and the national or domiciliary law of the decedent to the latter 7
The determination of the law that will be applied by the court of a given country
is further complicated by the doctrine of renvoi and the varying attitudes taken
towards it. If, for example, a German court has to deal with the succession to the
assets left by a national of France, it looks to and follows the conflicts rules of
France. Thus, to the distribution of the movables, the law of the country in which
the decedent had his domicile at the time of his death would be applied; to the
descent of each immovable asset, the law of the place where it is situated. Accord-
ingly, if the French decedent had his domicile in Switzerland and left an immovable
asset in Germany, the German court would apply Swiss law to the movables and
German law to the immovable. However, the Swiss "law" applied would again
primarily be the Swiss law of conflict of laws; but since, in the case given, Swiss
conflicts law refers or, at least, seems to refer, to the law of the country of domicile,'
Swiss substantive law would be applied. These results follow because renvoi is
generally accepted by the German courts. Renvoi is not accepted, however, by an
Italian court. Thus, if, in the case of a French national dying with his last domicile
'See Re Dennis' Estate, 98 Vt. 424, 129 AtI. 166 (1925); DICEY, op. Cit. tupra note I, at 535, 821;
CHsm-nRa, op. cit. supra note I, at 519, 56o; BEALE, op. cit. supra note x, at 969, 1034; GooDRucH, op. cit.
supra note i, at 505, 512.
"E.g., Wills Act, x861, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 114; MOIJEL ExECUtON OF WILLs Aar, 9 U.L.A. 419
(95). See note 14 infra.
'According to the list contained in MuRA FERID AND KARL FjReCmNO, INTERNATIONALES E1aszevCHT
No. 45 (9.55), the countries employing this standard are: Egypt, China, Cuba, Germany, Finland,
Greece, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Spain, Syria, Tangier, and Czecho-
slovakia.
'These criteria are invoked by the following countries: Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Argentina, Chile,
Ecuador, Colombia, Paraguay, Peru, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Brazil. See ibid.
"Invoking the lax situs for immovables and the lex domicili for movables are the following coun-
tries: France, Belgium, Luxemburg, Monaco, and Thailand. See id. No. 46. Invoking the lex silts
for immovables and the lex patriae for movables are the following countries: Bulgaria, Yugoslavia,
Austria, Liechtenstein, Rumania, Turkey, and Hungary. See id. No. 47; see also Nadelmann and von
Mchren, Draft Law on Private International Law, I AM. J. Coasp. L. 46, 423 (1952); WoLrF, op. cit.
supra note I, at 568. The several systems are combined in various ways in the following countries:
Switzerland, U.S.S.R., Bolivia, Uruguay, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti,
Honduras, Mexico, and Panama. See FEUD AND FIRSCIUNo, op. cit. supra note 5, No. 45, 48.
For an interesting appraisal of the different views and their validity in modern society, see STATE
OF ISRAEL MINISTRY Op JUSTIcE, SuccEssIoN BILL FOR ISRAEL, TEXT AND EXPLANATORY NOTES pt. 8, at
T52 (unpublished Harvard Law School translation 1952).
' See FEUD AND FsRsesnNo, op. cit. supra note 5, No. 45, 48.
SUCCESSION PLANNING 501
in Switzerland and leaving movables in Italy and an immovable asset in Germany,
a decision has to be made by an Italian court, it simply applies the substantive
law of France. If, in a given case, therefore, the circumstances present the possi-
bility that litigation may at some future time arise in the courts of one or more
foreign countries, the draftsman ought to obtain information not only as to the
general choice-of-law rules of each of these countries, but also as to the attitude taken
in each with respect to the problem of renvoi.
With this variation in the choice-of-law rules of different jurisdictions and with
the variations that occur in the internal laws on wills, descent, and distribution, it is
apparent that many potential conflicts problems must be considered in the careful
handling of the succession affairs of a client.
II
EXECUTION AND REVOCATION OF WILLS
A. Execution
I. Capacity of the Testator
The starting point in complying with the requisite formalities of will-execution
is the testamentary capacity of the estate owner. In this connection, it is important
to distinguish between problems of personal capacity or competence and other limi-
tations upon the freedom of testation, which will be discussed subsequently. Capacity
is determined, in absence of statute, by the law governing the succession of the
assets subject to the will.'0 To avoid the possibly invalidating effect of incapacity,
therefore, the testator should be capable under each of the following laws: the law
of his domicile, the law of his nationality, the law of the situs of his immovables,
and, in some instances, the law of the situs of his movables. Since personal law is
subject to change, any anticipated changes of residence or of nationality (or of
allegiance, in case of service in foreign armed forces) should be considered to assure
future capacity under such possibly applicable law.
In civil-law countries, it should be noted, several distinctions are made which are
not generally observed in this country. The capacity to transact legal business
of any kind is treated as an incident of an individual's general status. This general
capacity may be lacking because the individual is an infant or because he has been
judicially deprived of the capacity to transact business on account of mental disease,
feeblemindedness, habitual drunkenness, or being a spendthrift. The careful drafts-
man should, therefore, investigate these possibilities in any case in which there arises
a suspicion that such a judicial declaration may have been made in the country of
nationality, domicile, or situs of assets. It should also be noted that an individual,
though competent to transact legal business in general, may yet be incompetent to
make a will, or vice versa 1
o See ITALIAN CIVIL CODE art. 23, 30 (1942).
o See WoL'FF, op. cit. supra note x, at 581.
" See, e.g., GERMAN CIVIL CODE art. 2229, 2238 para. 3, 2247 para. 4 (1924) (although an indi-
vidual below the age of twenty-one is not generally competent to transact legal business, he may execute
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2. Formalities
The formalities of execution of a testamentary instrument constitute one of the
most important technical hurdles a lawyer has to overcome. Yet, if he is aware of
the possibilities and has available the needed fact information, a satisfactory solution
can generally be obtained.
Under the common-law rule governing the execution of an instrument which is
to dispose of immovables, the testator must have complied with the formalities of
the law of the situs;' 2 in order validly to dispose of movables, the testator must
have complied with the formalities of the law of his domicile as of the time of his
death. 3 The exclusive application of common-law rule governing the disposition of
movables is impracticable, however, because at the time of the execution of the
instrument, a testator cannot know where he will reside at the uncertain moment
of his death. Fortunately, therefore, the common law has been modified in most
states by statutes which provide, in varying language and with varying details, that
a testamentary instrument is to constitute a valid disposition of movables if the
formalities of execution required by the law of any one of the following have been
observed :14
a. the jurisdiction in which the instrument was executed;
b. the jurisdiction in which the testator was domiciled at the time the instrument
was executed;
c. the jurisdiction in which the testator was domiciled at the time of his death; or
d. the jurisdiction in which the assets in question are situated.
These statutes do not always effect what they seem to promise, however, especially
where immovables are involved." Whenever a testator owns immovables in a com-
a will; but he must use a special kind of notarial will-he cannot make an unwitncsscd holographic
will); FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 904 (5 4 th ed., Dalloz 9.55) (an individual between the ages of x6 and
21 cannot by will dispose of more than one half of that part of his estate of which a person can dispose
in general).
12 RESTATEMENT, CONFLIcr OF LAWS 5 249 (1934). See also note i supra.
"Moultrie v. Hunt, 23 N.Y. 394 (i86i). See also note 2 supra.
1" For a classification of these laws as well as an analysis of their operational variations, see Rabel,
The Form of Wills, 6 VANn. L. REV. 533 (953); Lorenzen, The Validity of Wills, Deeds, and Contracts
as Regards Form in the Conflict of Laws, 20 YALE L. J. 427 (sgi). The following are illustrative of
the statutes adopted by most of the states of the United States: ARIz. CODE ANN. § 38-215 (1939); Ans.
STAT. ANN. § 6045 (Supp. 1955); CAL. PROB. CODE 5362 (Supp. 1953); CONN. GEN. STAT. 96951 (1949);
GA. CODE § 113-709 (933); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-222 (1949); ILL. REV. STAT. C. 3, 3 85 (1953);
IowA CODE § 633.49 (1954); KAN. GEN. STAT. § 259-609 (I49); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2401 (1950)"
ME. REv. STAT. c. 154, 5 14 (1954); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAws art. 93, § 365 (1951); MASS. ANN.
Laws c. 191, §5 (1955); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(97) (Supp. 1955); MINN. STAT. § 525.183
(1953); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 91-115 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-204 (1943); NEV. Comp.
LAws § 9929 (1929); N. H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 551:5 (1955); N. M. STAT. ANN. § 30"1-10 (1953);
N.Y. DEC. EST. LAW §§ 22a, 23; N. D. REv. CODE § 56-03o6 (1943); OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 72 (1951);
R. I. GEN. LAWS c. 566, § 35 (1938); S. C. CODE § 19.207 (1952); S. D. CODE § 56.0212 (1939);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-107 (1955); UTAH CODE ANN. 5 74-1-14 (953); VT. REv. STAr. § 2840 (947);
WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.020 (1951); IVs. STAT. § 238.07 (953); WYO. CoNIP. STAT. ANN. § 6"503
(1945). See also Cohn, Der Richtung und Wiederruf von Testamenten mit Englischen Beziehungen in
der Schweiz, 1952 SCHWEIZERISCHE JURiSTENZERTUNG 129.
"5 See, e.g., Sternberg v. St. Louis Union Trust Co , 394 Il. 452, 68 N.E.2d 452 (1946).
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mon-law jurisdiction, therefore, the formalities prescribed by the law or laws of the
situs of each immovable asset should rigorously be observed.
The safest course for the draftsman to follow is to have the instrument so executed
that there are cumulatively observed the formalities prescribed in all common-law
jurisdictions. Compliance with the prescription is not difficult. The common-law
knows two forms of wills, the witnessed will, available in all jurisdictions, and the
unwitnessed holographic will, available only in some.' 6 The latter should, conse-
quently, be avoided whenever a testator is likely to leave assets in more than one
jurisdiction, and the following formalities for a witnessed will, which are essentially
the same in all common-law jursdictions, although the statutes vary in detail, should
be observed in the execution of every testamentary instrument:
I. The will should be declared in an instrument in writing.
2. The instrument should be signed by the testator or, if he cannot do so, by
another person who subscribes upon his request and in his presence.
3. The signature of the testator or of the person subscribing upon his request
and in his presence should be placed immediately following the text of the instru-
ment, without any blank space preceding it, and in no other place.
4. There should be at least three attesting witnesses.P
5. None of the attesting witnesses should be:
a. a beneficiary under the instrument or be appointed in it as executor or
trustee;
b. a spouse of a beneficiary under the instrument or of a person appointed in
it as executor or trustee;
c. a business partner of a beneficiary under the instrument or of a person
appointed in it as executor or trustee;
d. an officer or a stockholder in a corporation named in the instrument as a
beneficiary or appointed in it as executor or trustee; or
e. a resident of a city, town, county, or state to which there is made in the
instrument a gift tending to alleviate its tax burden-such as a gift for the benefit
of the poor of the town.
6. The attesting witnesses should be expressly asked by the testator to attest
"the execution of his will."
7- In the case of a testator who is able to write his signature, all the witnesses
should either:
'o Louisiana recently adopted a new statutory will form in addition to the codal wills previously
available. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9: 2442-44 (Supp. 1955); see Comment, The New Louisiana Wills
Act, 28 TuL. L. REV. 288 (954).
" The conflict-of-laws significance of the requirement by seven states that there be three witnesses
to a will has been reduced by the enactment in these states of statutes recognizing wills valid under the
law of the place of execution. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 6951 (i949); GA. CoDE § 113-709 (i933); ME.
REv. STAT. c. 154, § 14 (i954); MAss. ANN. LAws c. 191, § 5 (1955); N. H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 551:5
(1955); S. C. CODE § 19.207 (1952); VT. REv. STAT. § 2840 (1947). The conflict-of-laws effects of the
requirements of the Louisiana Code are also alleviated by a similar provision. LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:2401 (1950).
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a. observe the signing of the instrument by the testator; or
b. hear him expressly state that he acknowledges as made by him a signature
which is already upon the instrument and which is pointed out to, and actually seen
by, all the witnesses.
In the case of a testator who is not able to write his signature, all the witnesses
should observe that:
a. an express request to sign the instrument is directed by the testator to the
person by whom the instrument is to be signed; and
b. the instrument is signed by the person so requested and that such signing is
done in the presence of the testator.
8. The witnesses should be told that the instrument is to be the testator's will.
9. Every witness should affix his signature and address to the instrument in the
presence of the testator-ie., within his unobstructed line of vision.
io. All witnesses, the testator, and, if necessary, the person signing for him
should be present simultaneously during the entire transaction of execution.
ii. The instrument should be dated by fully and correctly stating the place and
the day, month, and year of its execution.
i2. The observation of all the formalities listed, except those stated under 3 and
5, above, should expressly be recited in the attestation clause, which should also indi-
cate the number of pages of which the instrument consists.
13. Every sheet of the instrument should be initialed by the testator and all the
witnesses; the sheets should be numbered consecutively, and be securely fastened
together.
In the civil-law countries, the rule of locus regit actum is universally observed."8
For the disposition of assets situated in a civil-law country, therefore, observation
of the formalities of the law of the place of execution is sufficient in all cases, unless
the testator is a national of the Netherlands or the Republic of Indonesia, in which
case the will ought to be executed before the Dutch or Indonesian consul, as the
case may be.'9 Execution before the consul of the country of the situs is also ad-
visable in all cases in which the instrument is to dispose of immovables, a ship, or an
aircraft, because difficulties may otherwise be encountered when the testamentary
transfer is sought to be recorded upon the local record of tides or to be registered
in the local registry of deeds.
B. Revocation
The discussion of problems of execution must inevitably touch on the troublesome
matter of revocation, for perhaps "revocation is merely the converse of execution
... whether an instrument is a will is determined not only by the manner of its
"
8 See MAX RREINSTEiN, DAs RECHTSGESCHAEFT IM INTERNATIONALEN PRiVATREcHr 4 (1933); FRANZ
SCHLEGELBERGER, RECHTSVERGLEICHENDES HANDWOERTERBUCH 359 (1933). See also GONZALO E. PARRA,
A. DIE REGEL "LOCUS REGIT ACTUM" UND DIE FORMEN DE TESTAMENTE-LA RELA "LOCUS REOIT
ACTUM" Y FORMA DE LOS TESTAMENTOS 3o6 (1955) (text in German and Spanish).
"See NETHERLANDS CIVIL CODE art. 992 (1829).
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execution but also by the manner of its attempted revocation."2 Revocation by in-
tentional act, such as cancellation, obliteration, or destruction, is generally governed
under Anglo-American law by the law of the last domicile in the case of movables21
and by the law of the situs in the instance of immovables.s2 If there is a statute in
the forum or the state of the governing law, such as Lord Kingsdown's Act 3
or the Uniform Wills Act,24 however, the answer is uncertain; for, these acts pur-
port to refer questions of valid execution to the law of states other than the forum,
and the issue then becomes one of whether problems of "revocation" are to be
treated as problems of "execution. '25 The matter is further complicated by the
alternative references of the statutes in an attempt to validate-i., to carry out
the testator's intention. In so far as an intentional revocation is meant to have
effect in a civil-law country, however, the rule of locus regit actum applies, which
means that the revocation is effective in every civil-law country if the formalities of
the law of the place of acting have been observed. 6
Difficult problems of choice of law can also arise in connection with the possible
revocation of a will by operation of law. At common law, the will of a man was
revoked when, subsequent to its execution, he married and a child was born
to him; the will of a woman was revoked by her subsequent marriage. Modern
statutes in this country and other common-law jurisdictions have considerably modi-
fied these rules, frequently substituting for the total inoperativeness of the instrument
the provision of a share in the estate for the spouse or for a child born after the
execution of the instrument2 The conflicts problems raised by such statutes will
be discussed below in connection with the problems caused by laws giving certain
persons rights to share in a decedent's estate in contradiction to, or in supplementation
of, the provisions of a will 28 A more modern development in revocation by opera-
tion of law is found in a few states of the United States, where a testamentary pro-
vision in favor of the testator's spouse becomes ineffective in the case of divorceY
9°
20 Re Barries' Estate, 240 Iowa 43! , 447, 35 N.W.ad 658, 666 ('949) (Smith, J., dissenting).
"1 See Rabbe v. McAllister, 177 Md. 97, 8 A.2d 922, (1939); Cottrell v. Cottrell, L.R. 2 P. & D.
397 (1872)-
22 See Re Barrie's Estate, 240 Iowa 431, 35 N.W.ad 658 (949); In re Kimberly's Estate, 32 S.D. x,
I4 N.W. Xo8i (1913); WOLFF, op. cit. supra note i, at 594.
"3 Wills Act, 1861, 24 and 25 VICr. c. 114. Canadian variations of this act have been adopted by
Saskatchewan (931) and Manitoba (1936). See JoHN D. FALCONBRiDGE, CONFLICr OF LAWS 546 (2d
ed. 1954). Similar statutes are also in effect in Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia, Ontario, and
Quebec. See Cohn, supra note 24.
2" For a more detailed examination of the extent to which this act and others of similar purpose have
been adopted, see note r4 supra.
-'See Re Barrie's Estate, 240 Iowa 431, 35 N.W.ad 658 (2949); In re Traversi's Estate, 289 Misc.
252, 64 N.Y.S. 2d 453 (Surr. Ct. 1946). Three states expressly include both execution and revocation in
their statutes. See MONT. Pxv. CoDEs ANN. § 91-115 (947); OKILA. STAT. tit. 84, § 72 (1951); S. D.
CODE § 56.0212 (1939).
-" See RHEINS=IN, op. cit. supra, note 18.
"See MAx RH INs'rTIN, LAw oF DECEDEN S' EsrATaS 284 (2d ed. 1955); Graunke and Beuseher, The
Doctrine of Implied Revocation of Wills by Reason of Change in Domestic Relations of the Testator,
5 Wis. L. REV. 385 (2930).
21 See text at note 46 et seq. infra.
21 See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 6i, § 15 (Supp. 1953); ARx. STAT. ANN. §60-407 (Supp. 1955); FLA.
STAT. § 732.261 (1953); GA. CODE § X13-408 (1933).
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Such statutes usually contain no exception for contrary testamentary directions. In the
civil-law countries, it may be observed, revocation by operation of law does not
appear presently to play an important role, except in the case of divorce.
The problem of ascertaining the law by which it will be determined whether
or not a will, or a provision in it, has been revoked by operation of law, is un-
settled' 0 For the draftsman, it is practically impossible to foretell the disturbing
effects which events occurring subsequent to the execution of a client's will may have
on the effectiveness of the instrument. Consequently, he should impress the client
with the necessity of having his will reviewed and, if necessary, revised in the case of
his marriage, divorce, or removal from one jurisdiction to another. Periodic review
is desirable for other reasons, too, especially to guard against the effects of changes
which may have occurred in any one of the laws which are, or may become, relevant
with respect to the ultimate effectiveness of the client's testamentary scheme.
The many possibilities of invalidity that may operate upon a testamentary instru-
ment also suggest that the cautious draftsman will advise his client of alternatives
in every case and suggest means of holding assets and their location during his
lifetime so that intestacy will approximate the testator's intention as nearly as possible.
In short, a planned intestacy is the final insurance against failure of the testamentary
scheme and should be considered if the opportunity is available.
III
DisposirivE PRovisIoNs
A. Limitations on Freedom of Testation
I. Protecting the Family
In most countries, an individual's freedom to transfer his assets at death is
hedged about by limitations of which the draftsman must be aware. As these
limitations vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, they present many conflict-of-laws
complications. In western civilization, the principal limitations upon testation grew
out of policies favoring the protection of the family.3 ' This protection may be
given in several ways. At common law, the person sought to be protected-i.e.,
the spouse-was given a property interest in every piece of realty of which the
other spouse was seised of an estate of inheritance at any time during coverture.
"o Most American states follow the general rules of succession, see, e.g., Lee v. Monks, 318 Mass. 513,
62 N.E.2d 657 (1945); Re Wehr's Will, 247 Wis. 98, z8 N.W.,d 709 (1945); Barnes v. Graves, 259
Ky. s8o, 82 S.W.,d 297 (935); Re Dennis' Estate, 98 Vt. 424, 129 At. 166 (1925); but the effect
of the statutes is not entirely clear. Some states, on the other hand, indicate that some law other than
that usually governing succession may be applied. See, e.g., In re Traversi's Estate, 189 Misc. 251, 64
N.Y.S.2d 453 (1946); ci. Galley v. Brown, 169 Wis. 444, 171 N.W. 945 (1919). For express statutory
references, see statutes cited note 25 supra. England appears to apply the law of the matrimonial
domicile in case of revocation by subsequent marriage. See In re Martin, [9oo] P. 211, 240; see also Re
Goods of Reid, L.R. i P. & D. 74 (1866); Seifert v. Seifert, 32 Ont. L.R. 433 (914), 23 D.L.R.
440 (1915).
"See Nussbaum, Liberty of Testation, 23 A.B.A.J. 183 (937); Dainow, Forced Heirship in
French Law, 2 LA. L. REv. 669 (1940); McMurray, Liberty of Testation and Some Modern Limitations
Thereon, 14 ILL. L. REV. 96 (1919).
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As this interest arose during the lifetime of the owner of the asset of realty in
question, it could be affected neither by his disposition inter vivos nor by his will.
This technique of protecting the spouse of an owner of realty by means of dower,
curtesy, or homestead, as the case may be, is still used in numerous states of this
country, and it seems not to have disappeared completely in the other countries of
the common law.
Another way of protecting certain members of the decedent's family against dis-
inheritance is that of granting them the right to take a certain minimum share
in the estate, even against the wishes of the testator. In the French Civil Code and
those numerous laws following its pattern, the end is achieved by limiting the por-
tion of the estate of which an owner may dispose by will. An indefeasible share
in the estate appertains to each child or to each of certain other classes of relatives,
such as brothers and sisters, parents, grandparents, or even parents-in-law. Thus, if
a property owner dies being survived by one legitimate child, he may, under the
French Civil Code, dispose by his will of no more than one-half of his estate; if he
dies being survived by two legitimate children, of no more than one-third; and
if he dies survived by three or more legitimate children, of no more than one-
fourth. 2 If there are three children, each is, thus, entitled to a one-fourth share in
each asset of the estate as a tenant in common together with the other children and
the legatee or legatees in whose favor the testator has made provision in his will.
If that provision was for more than one-fourth, it is reduced to that portion.
Under the German Civil Code and those other laws which follow its pattern, a
substantially equivalent result is achieved by a slightly different technique. Each
member of the favored class is given a claim to the payment of an amount of money
corresponding to the value of a certain portion of the estate33 If a testator who dies
being survived by his wife and two children has by his will given all his estate to
a stranger, the latter takes as "heir," but has to pay to the widow the money value of
one-eighth and to each of the children the money value of three-sixteenths of the
net estate34
In the United States, an "indefeasible share" of the surviving spouse has been
established in almost all states as to personalty and, in a great many, as to realty
as well, either as a substitute for common-law dower or curtesy, or as an alternative
to be elected by the surviving spouse in lieu of dower or curtesy33 This indefeasible
share under the American statutes is similar in structure to the forced portion of the
civil law, except in one respect. In this country, the indefeasible share is a portion in
the net estate as it exists at the time of the owner's death and usually after the pay-
ment of taxes, debts, and expenses. If the owner has, therefore, before his death,
given away all his property by gifts inter vivos, the interest of the surviving spouse
32 FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 913 (5 4 th ed., Dalloz 1955).
"3 GERMAN CIVIL CODE art. 2303 et seq (1924).
" Id. at art. 2303.
"E.g., FLA. STAT. § 731.34 (1953); IOwA CODE § 636.5 (954); MINN. STAT. § 525.16 (1953); N. Y.
DEC. EsT. Lxv § 18; see also 3 ChESTER GARFIELD VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 189 (1935).
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may be defeated. Protection against such defeasance of the indefeasible share by
gifts inter vivos is of limited value in most of our states.0 In the civil-law coun-
tries, however, gifts made either in a general or in a certain way, or within a
certain period before the donor's death are ineffective as against those persons who
are entitled to a forced share in his future decedent estate 7 Provisions which thus
limit a property owner's freedom to dispose of his assets not only by will, but also by
gift inter vivos, must be kept in the mind of the attorney who develops an estate
plan for a client owning assets in a civil-law country.
In England, the system of the forced share, which had been established there
under the influence of the Church, disappeared in the late seventeenth and early
eighteenth centuries. This was followed by the system of dower and curtesy.
Restricted by statutes in 1833, dower and curtesy were abolished in 1925, and a
property owner's freedom of testation was complete.3 s A new system of indefeasible
protection of family dependents has now come to obtain, however, in numerous
jurisdictions of the British Commonwealth, including England. Following a pattern
set by a New Zealand law of 19oo, a family member who was dependent upon the
decedent may, by judicial discretion, be granted the right to a maintenance pro-
vision out of the assets of the estate.39
Nearly everywhere, as well, temporary protection is given certain dependents,
especially the surviving spouse and minor children, by the right to receive out of the
estate a certain amount for their support and maintenance for a short period
following their provider's death. Such claims for an allowance for the surviving
spouse or minor children, although recognized in many parts of the world under
both the common and civil law, vary greatly in detail.4 9
Family protection is, finally, achieved in several jurisdictions of this country4' and
in numerous civil-law countries through the operation of the various systems of
community property, whose effect in the case of a married couple is that certain
assets belong to neither the husband nor the wife, but to both; so that at the death
of one spouse, only one-half of the community fund belongs to his decedent estate,
while the other half belongs to the surviving spouse. Under the approach prevailing
in the United States, most problems of which assets, if any, are community property,
as between the spouses at least, is determined by the law of the jurisdiction in which
" Cf. Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937); Norris v. Barbour, r88 Va. 723, 51
S.E.2d 334 (949); PA. STAT. tit. 20, § 5301.11(19) (1936).
"See RHEiNsTEiN, op. ct. supra note 27, at 63.
3S 3 & 4 WILL. 4, C. 105 (x833); 15 GRo. 5, C. 23, § 45() (1925).
"E.g., FAMILY PROVISION Aar, i & 2 GEO. 6, C. 45 (1938); 64 Vlcr. No. 2o (New Zealand 19oo),
as amended, ii Gao. 6, No. 6o, § 15 (New Zealand 1947); 6 EDw. 7, No. 2074 (Victoria igo6); 3
Gao. 5, No. 7 (Tasmania 19X2); 5 GEO. 5, No. 26 (Queensland 1914); 1s GEo. 6, C. 12 (Alberta 1947),
as amended, 15 Gao. 6, c. 91, § 3 (Alberta 195); B. C. REv. STAT. c. 336 (1948); 4 MAN. Rvv. STAT.
C. 264 (954); ONT. REV. STAT. c. ox (195o); r SAsK. REv. STAT. c. 121 (1953). See also Laufer,
Flexible Restraints on Testamentary Freedom-A Report on Decedents' Family Maintenance Legisla-
tion, 69 HARV. L. REV. 277 (1955).
"o Administrative problems concerning allowances are discussed at note 162 in/ra.
"' E.g., California, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, Washington, Arizona, Texas, Louisiana, and Puerto
Rico.
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the married couple was domiciled at the time of the acquisition of the asset in ques-
tion4 This is because most situs courts would refer the question to the domicile
of the parties. Also, it must be kept in mind that under the substitution rule, which
is generally applied in this country, the proceeds acquired from the sale or other
alienation of an asset retain the character of the asset alienated. While the substi-
tution rule and the situs reference determine most cases, exceptions are still sufficiently
numerous to warrant investigation of both the law of the situs of assets and the
personal law of the parties since their marriage for law that may have application
to their marital property.43
With respect to the property interests of one spouse in the realty of the other
(e.g., dower, curtesy, homestead), the conflicts rule is simple: they are determined for
each parcel of land by the law of its situs 4 Not so clear, however, is the conflicts
rule which indicates that legal system by which it is determined whether or not a
benefit given by the will of one spouse to the other is in lieu of dower or in addi-
tion theretoY' The draftsman should, therefore, in every case, first clearly spell
out whether the provision is intended to have one of these effects or the other; and,
if the provision is meant to be in lieu of dower or other interest, he ought to ascertain
whether this effect can be achieved under the laws of both the situs of the land and
that jurisdiction of which the testator is likely to be a domiciliary at the time of his
death.
The extent to which a testator's freedom of testation is limited by these family
protection doctrines is determined by the law that governs descent and distribution
of the estate. With respect to movable property located in a common-law jurisdiction,
the court of the situs can be expected to apply the law of the state of the testator's
last domicile,4" or to allow the assets to be collected by the domiciliary administrator,
or to forward them to the domicile for distribution. Immovable property, on the
other hand, must be expected to be treated by the law of the situs in accordance
with its own internal rules4
5 See I ERNS" RABEL, CONFLICT OF LAWS C. 10 (1945); HAROLD MARSH, MARITAL PROPERTY IN CON-
FLICT OF LA Ws (1952); Goodrich and Coleman, Pennsylvania Marital Communities dnd Common Law
Neighbors, 96 U. PA. L. REv. I (947); Neuner, Marital Property and the Conflict of Laws, 5 LA. L.
REv. 167 (943); Leflar; Community Property and the Conflict of Laws, 21 CALIF. L. REV. 221 (1933);
Stumberg, Marital Property and Conflict of Laws, ii T~x. L. REv. 53 (1932); Harding, Matrimonial
Domicile and Marital Rights in Movables, 30 MICH. L. Rav. 859 (1932); Goodrich, Matrimonial Dom-
.icile, 27 YALE L. J. 49 (1917).
'a Cf. 1 RABEL, op. cit. supra note 42, at 337-43; MARSH, op. cit. supra note 42, at 100-03.
"E.g., In re Estate of Randolph, 175 Kan. 685, 266 P.2d 315 (I954); Spence v. Spence 239 Ala.
480, 195 So. 717 (1940); Ehler v. Ehler, 214 Iowa 789, 243 N.W. 591 (1932); Bullen v. Wisconsin,
240 U.S. 625 (1916).
4" Cf. text and citations at note 174 infra.
40 See note 44 supra. An exception is constituted by Mississippi, where a unique statute provides for
-the application of its own law to the succession to all assets, both immovable and movable, which are
*situated in Mississippi. Miss. CODE ANN. § 467 (1942).
"7But cf. Estate of Clemmons, 242 Iowa 1248, 49 N.W.2d 883 (195i); Proctor v. Frost, 89 N.H.
304, 197 AdI. 813 (1938); Hite v. Hite, 301 Mass. 294, 17 N.E.2d 176 (1938); Poison v. Stewart, 167
Mass. 211, 45 N.E. 737 (1897); In re Peabody's Estate, i 5 N.Y.S.2d 337 (Sup. Ct. 1952); In re
Ruperti's Estate, 194 Misc. 376, 86 N.Y.S.2d 887 (Surr. Ct. 1949); In re Bernie's Estate, 74 N.Y.S.2d
'887 (Surr. Ct. 1947).
510 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
If movable or immovable assets are located in a civil-law country, the draftsman
has to determine what choice-of-law rules the courts at the situs will apply. Thus,
if a national of the United States owns immovables in France, the extent of his power
to dispose of them would be determined by the rules of French law concerning
the disposable portion.4 8 As to movables situated in France, however, the law applied
by the French courts would be that of the testator's place of residence as of the
time of his death 9 If, at that time, he was a resident of France, the French courts
would apply French substantive law; if he was a resident of a jurisdiction following
the last domicile reference, the French courts would apply the internal law of that
jurisdiction; but if, at the time of his death, the decedent was a resident of Italy,
then the French would look to Italian conflicts law 0 and would, by that law, be
referred to the law of the country of which the decedent was a national at the time
of his death,5 ' which, in our hypothetical, would be the law of the United States.
Unfortunately, however, the United States does not have one law on the distribu-
tion of decedents' estates, and so it is uncertain to which law the Italian conflicts
rule would refer, although it would likely be that the internal law of the American
jurisdiction in which the testator resided at the time of his death would be applied."2
A different approach would be followed, however, if at the time of his death
the American owner of French movable assets resided in Germany, a country which,
in contrast to Italy, readily accepts renvoi. In such a case, the French court, being
by its own law referred to the conflicts law of Germany, would apply that law to
which German conflicts law refers-i.e., the law of the country of which the de-
cedent was a national. In contrast to an Italian court, a German court would not,
however, immediately search for the American substantive law, but for the Ameri-
can rule of conflicts law. Before the era of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins,"3 the German
courts assumed that there existed a uniform conflicts law for the United States and
that that rule referred problems relating to a decedent's movables to the law of the
decedent's domicile at death. Since, in our hypothetical, that domicile was in Ger-
many, German substantive law would be applied. And although the notion of a
uniform federal law of conflicts no longer exists, 54 the states so uniformly apply
the domicile rule that it can still be expected to be applied by the courts of Germany
and other countries applying the rule of the national law."
If the national of the United States who dies leaving movable assets in France
had his residence in- England at the time of his death, the case may be further
"See HENRI BATIFFOL, TRAMT- DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVf 702 (2d ed. 1955).
'9 Ibid.
90 See id. at 352.
"1 ITALIAN CIVIL CODE art. 23 (1942).
92Cf. Rheinstein, Lo statuto personale dei sudditi degli Stati Uniti d'America GIURISPRUDENZA
COMPARATA DI DIRITrO INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO 141 (1937).
9304 U.S. 64 (938).
"See Klaxon v. Stentor, 313 U.S. 487 (1941); Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (194x).
"C]. Rheinstein, Das Kollisionsrecht im System des Verfassungsrechts der Vereinigten Staaten von
Amerika, i FES. CHRIFT FUER ERNsr RABEL 539 (1954); LEO RAAPE, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECIIT 145
(4th ed. 1955).
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complicated by the possibility that the decedent's domicile, as defined by English
notions, does not coincide with his residence, as defined by French law. In such
a case, it is possible that under French notions, the decedent was a resident of
England, and under English notions, a domiciliary of France. The French court
would then be referred to the English conflicts law, which, in turn, would refer
the case back to French law. Since English courts practice not only the simple,
but also the double renvoi, they might well regard the new reference to the law
of France as one to French conflicts law and accept that law's reference to the law
of England5 The French courts would probably assume that the English courts
would stop at this point and decide the case under English substantive law. That
the French courts would exercise, however, the power of an English court under
the English Family Maintenance Act to burden the estate with the payment of
annuities to dependent relatives may well be doubted.
These various hypothetical cases are presented to indicate to the draftsman how
difficult, or even hopeless, it may be in some cases for him to foresee whether or
not his client's testamentary scheme will stand up against attacks by persons claiming
under the forced heirship or family maintenance laws of some foreign country.
The only safe way to avoid such contingencies, therefore, is to see that at the time
of the death, the client will not own assets within a country whose courts are likely
to give effect to its own forced heirship laws or those of some other country to which
they may be referred by their conflicts rules.
The end of protecting a testator's family against disinheritance has been pursued
not only by statutes giving indefeasible rights to the persons sought to be protected,
but also, indirectly, by statutes limiting the validity of gifts to such persons as an
illegitimate child,57 or a mistress,58 or to those in a position to exercise undue influ-
ence over the testator's mind5 Of particular importance in this respect are those
statutes which limit a testator's freedom to make testamentary gifts to charities.
These statutes are of two types. Statutes of the first type interdict gifts to charities
in testamentary instruments executed within a short time prior to death." These
"hell-fire statutes" were designed to vitiate deathbed "soul-saving" gifts by pre-
suming a kind of incompetence or undue influence by reason of the fear of the
hereafter.6 The second type of statutes is that which prohibits the gift of more
" Cf. In re Annesley (1926] Ch. 692.
"E.g., S. C. CODE § 19.238 (1952); FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 908 (5 4 th ed., Dalloz 1955).
"E.g., S. C. CODE § 19.238 (1952).
" E.g., under the laws of France, as well as those of Louisiana and numerous other jurisdictions
following the French pattern, a legacy cannot be given to the testator's guardian, FRENCH CIVIL CODE
art. 907 (54 th ed., Dalloz 1955), the physician by whom he was treated or the spiritual adviser by whom
he was assisted in his last illness, id. art. 909, or any officer of the ship on which the testator was a
passenger when he made his will. Id. art. 995.
"°E.g., FLA. STAT. § 731.19 (953); OHIO REV. CODE § 2107.o6 (953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 17,
(Supp. 1955); id. at tit. 2o, § 18o.7 (1950); D. C. CODE ANN. § 19-202 (951).
"The effective operation of these provisions can perhaps be limited by adding new charitable gifts
to the estate plan by way of codicil, so as to avoid having the entire will re-executed. Appropriate
protective wording of the codicil may be helpful to avoid any possible invalidation of the total will through
a concept of republication by codicil. Cf. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.7 (1) (1950).
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than a certain portion of the estate when designated members of the family survive
the testator."2 Often called "charity-begins-at-home statutes," these are designed to
assure provision for those for whom the state feels the testator should have concern.
These two types of statutes may be combined in various ways to give effect to these
policies, both of which have root in the concern for the family and its reasonable
expectation not to be deprived of the "family fortune."' 3
Consistent application of the policy of family protection would require that in
the case of a testator leaving assets in several jurisdictions, there ought to be applied
the limiting laws of that jurisdiction, and only that, which is legitimately concerned
with the protection of the testator's family-i.e., that of his domicile or nationality,
depending upon which of these contacts is regarded as the relevant one at the
forum.64 Several American states have, nevertheless, applied their own laws when
dealing with immovables situated within their territories.00 In computing the dis-
posable share, they have either taken the estate as a whole-i.e., including the assets
situated outside of the forum state6 -- or only the assets situated within it.07  Under
a third method, the court considers not only the value of the assets situated outside
of the forum state, but also the value of the benefits which the heir or other person
protected has received in other jurisdictions.
Statutes designed to protect the families of testators against disinheritance must
be distinguished from statutes intended to prevent the accumulation of wealth in
the "dead hand"--i.e., in the hands of the church, charities, and other corporations
and institutions. Such mortmain acts exist in several of the states of the United
States and in some foreign countries. The authority of a corporation to receive or
hold property may be limited by a prohibition against bequests or devises to it or by
a maximum amount of property, particularly realty, that it can hold.69 Violations
'2 E.g., IowA CODE § 633-3 (1954); N.Y. DEc. Esr. LAw § 17.
"sE.g., CAL. PROB. CODE, § 41 (949); GA. CODE ANN. § 113-107 (Supp. 1951); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 14-326 (1948); Miss. CODE ANN. § 671 (1942); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 91-142 (1947).
C f. Wilson, Computation of the Legitime When Estate of the Deceased Consists of Assets in
Several States, so LA. L. REV. 525 (1950); Scoles, Conflict of Laws and Nonbarrable Interests in Ad-
ministration of Decedents Estates, 8 U. FLA. L. REv. 151, x68 (1955). On the problem of the law
determining the validity of gifts to beneficiaries of a certain kind, see also WOLFF, op. cit. supra note
I, at 577; CHESHIRE, op. cit. supra note I, at 522; DICEY, op. cit. supra note I, at 820; Breslauer,
Conflict of Laws in Restrictions of Freedom of Testation, 27 IowA L. REV. 425 (1942). For complica-
tions as to gifts to aliens, see text at note 107 infra.
"' See Joslin, Conflict of Laws Problems Raised by "Modern Mortmain Acts," 6o DIcx. L. REV. 7
(1955); Joslin, "Mortmain" in Canada and the United States, 29 CAN. B. REv. 621 (1951).
" See Estate of Lewis, 32 La. Ann. 385 (88o).
17 See Jard v. Moon's Succession, 19o So. 867 (La. App. 1939).
"SSee Paschal v. Acklin, 27 Tex. 173 (x863); Estate of Dwyer, 159 Cal. 68o, x 5 Pac. 242 (1911);
Estate of Lathrop, 165 Cal. 243, 131 Pac. 752 (9r3); Estate of Gracey, 200 Cal. 482, 253 Pac. 921
(1927); Estate of Lanton, 217 Cal. 451, 59 P.2d 793 (1933); Decker v. Vreeland, 22o N.Y. 326, 115
N.E. 989 (1917). As to the repercussions on the domiciliary administration, see In re Ogilvie, [1918]
I Ch. 492; In re Lawrence's Will, 93 Vt. 424, 198 At. 387 (1919); Thompson v. Surrpe, 24 Pa. 474
(1855).
6E.g., CAL. PRoa. CODE § 27 (Supp. 1951); ILL. REV. STAT. c. 32, § 181 (1953); IOWA CODE
§.567.1 0954); ME. REV. STAT. c. 54, § 5 (1954); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAws art. 23, S 249 (1951);
MINN. STAT. § 500.22 (i953); NE. REv. STAT. § 76-402 (1943); N. D. REV. CODE § 56-0205 (1943);
TEx. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 166 (948); VA. CODE § 57-12 (Supp. 1954); Curtis v. Maryland Bap-
tist Union Ass'n, 176 Md. 430, 5 A.2d 836 (1939).
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of such prohibitions may be treated as rendering a disposition to the corporation
invalid or as invalidating the continued holding. In the first event, the subject-
matter accrues to the heirs or to those who benefit from the lapse of a legacy or
devise; 70 in the latter, it is often only the state that can intervene. 1 In either event,
the purpose of the testator's gift is frustrated. As mortmain laws are intended to
limit the capacity of the corporation to receive or hold property rather than the
dispositive power of testators, the law applicable is that which determines the
powers of the corporation,72 which may be the law under which it is incorporated,
or, in Europe, the law of the place of the main office, or, possibly, the law of the
situs of the land devised."3 Consideration of this pitfall by the draftsman would
seem necessary to avoid frustration of the testator's intention."4
2. Perpetuities, Accumulations, and Conditions
The conflict-of-laws rules relating to the validity of dispositions questioned be-
cause of possibly invalid perpetuities, accumulations, or conditions are not sufficiently
developed to permit a firm statement to the effect that the law governing the suc-
cession generally shall determine these questions. In the Anglo-American jurisdic-
tions, the decisions in the nontrust cases appear to indicate the usual choice-of-law
reference to the situs of immovables and to the testator's domicile at death in the
case of movables" 0 Most of the problems of this type, however, have arisen in
cases involving trusts, wherein alternative references to the usual governing law
or to the law of the place of administration have been made to sustain validity."6
It is also indicated that an express choice-of-law clause in the trust instrument
may permit the testator effectively to determine the governing law, if the law chosen
has at least some reasonably close connection to the facts at hand."" These results
in the trust cases may well be extended to nontrust cases. For example, the policy
" See Kennett v. Kidd, 87 Kan. 652, 125 Pac. 36 (1912); Proctor v. Methodist Episcopal Church,
So., 225 Mo. 51, X23 S.W. 862 (19o9); Re McGraw, iii N.Y. 66, 19 N.E. 233 (1888); Davidson
College v. Chambers, 56 N.C. 253 (1857).
"* See Bank of Commerce and Trust Co. v. Banks, 161 Tenn. Ix, 28 S.W.2d 340 (930); Waters
v. Order of the Holy Cross, 155 Md. 146, 142 Atl. 297 (1928); Hubbard v. Worcester Art Museum, 194
Mass. 28o, 8o N.E. 490 (1907); Farrington v. Putnam, 90 Me. 405, 37 Ad. 652 (1897). See also
Alger, Consequences of Illegal or Ultra Vires Acquisition of Real Estate by a Corporation, 8 Hv.
L. Rav. 15 (1894).
"' But Cf. WoLFF, op. cit. supra note i, at 578.
" See In re Lampson's Will, 161 N.Y. 511, 56 N.E. 9 (I9OO); Hollis v. Drew Theological Seminary,
95 N.Y. 166 (1884); cf. Kerr v. Dougherty, 79 N.Y. 327 (1879).
"' Under some laws, an individual convicted of certain crime may be incapable of acquiring property
by way of succession on death. See, e.g., FRENCH PENAL. CODE art. 9(2) (52d ed., Dalloz 1955). Such
a penal law, however, is unlikely to be applied in other states.
See DICEY, op. cit. supra: note i, at 829; CH-asiuR, op. cit. supra note i, at 533, 557.
"See, e.g., Shannon v. Irving Trust Co., 275 N.Y. 95, 9 N.E.2d 792 (X937); Matter of Chappell, 124
Wash. X28, 213 Pac. 684 (1923).
"'See Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., 26 Del. Ch. 397, 24 A.2d 309 (5942); Wil-
mington Trust Co. v. Sloane, 30 Del. Ch. 103, 54 A.2d 544 (X947); Application of New York Trust
Co., X97 Misc. 598, 87 N.Y.S.2d 787 (Sup. Ct. 1949). See also WALTER W. LAND, TRusrs IN "HE
CONFLICt OF LAws ix8 (1940); Cavers, Trusts Inter Vivos and the Conflict of Laws, 44 HARv. L. REv.
161 (1930).
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behind the rule against perpetuities varies only slightly from state to state." The
trust cases indicate that the choice-of-law reference which sustains the trust most
often will be applied 9 The cases referring to the law of the place of administration
point out that the policies behind the rule concern the place where the assets are to be
administered 0 It is possible, then, in cases of similar legal interests in movables,
that a court could consider that the state of the location of the assets in the hands
of the first taker would be the state most concerned, even though normally such
a contact point is ignored.
Extreme caution must be used by the planner of an international estate in cre-
ating even the most familiar common-law future interests and trusts. While
analogous institutions may be found in civil-law countries, the analogy may, in many
instances, be misleading s  Interests which are considered by a common-law court
to be vested and free from questions of perpetuities may well be invalid under a
civil-law restriction if postponed for more than ten, twenty, or thirty years8 2 The
trust is a concept nearly unique to the common-law countries, and attempted transi-
tion to civil-law substitutes is dangerous s
The problem of the illegal or immoral condition remains to be mentioned. At
the outset, it should be recognized that attitudes vary in different countries. What
may seem reasonable in one place may be illegal or immoral in another.8 4 Con-
sequently, attaching conditions calling for an individual to perform or desist in per-
forming some act which relates to politics, marriage, or religion is of doubtful
wisdom. For example, an attempt to impose upon foreign legatees a restraint op-
posed to prevailing political or religious attitudes in the country where the gift may
have to be enforced is likely to result in its being stricken as contrary to public
"See Shannon v. Irving Trust Co., 275 N.Y. 95, 9 N.E.2d 792 (1937); Cross v. United States
Trust Co. 131 N.Y. 330, 30 N.E. :25 1892).
" See, e.g., Hope v. Brewer, 136 N.Y. 126, 32 N.E. 558 (1892). See also Note, Social Limitations on
Wealth Disposition and the Conflict of Laws, 32 CoLums. L. REv. 68o (1932).
80 See, e.g., Amerige v. Atty. Gen., 324 Mass. 648, 88 N.E.2d 126 0949); Matter of Chappell, 124
Wash. 128, 213 P. 684 (1923); Curtis v. Curtis, 185 App. Div. 39r, 173 N.Y. Supp. 103 (1st Dep't
1918). See also Swabenland, The Conflict of Laws in Administration of Express Trusts of Personal
Property, 45 YALE L. J. 438 (1936); Beale, Living Trusts of Movables in the Conflict of Laws, 45 HARV.
L. REv. 969 (1932).
81See P. J. EDER, ANGLo AmERICAN AND LATIN AMERICAN LAW 12 (1950); WOLFF, op. cit. sttpra
note 1, at 591; cf. In re Piercy, [2895] I Ch. 83.
"SSee EDER, op. cit. supra note 8I, at 124.
s See id. at 88; PIERRuE GEORGES LEPAuLLE, TERATE TIIEORIQUR ET PRATIQUE DES TRUSTS (1932), and
Rheinstein, Book Review, 43 YALE L. J. 1049 (1934); FELix WEsER, TRUSTS ON THlE CONTINENT OF
EURoPE (2936); Lepaulle, Civil Law Substitutes for Trusts, 36 YALE L.J. 126 (1926); Mayer, Trusts
and Swiss Law, i INT'L & Comp. L. Q. 378 (2952); Nussbaum, Sociological and Comparative Aspects of
the Trust, 38 CoLus. L. REv. 408 (1938); Patton, Trust Systems in the Western Hemisphere, 29 TUL. L.
REv. 398 (1945); Wuerdinger, The German Trust, 33 J. CoMPv. LEo. & INT'L L. (3d ser.) 31 (951).
The trust of the Anglo-American pattern has been introduced by modern legislation in the principality
of Liechtenstein, Law of Jan. 20, 1926, art. 897-932a, as amended, Law of April so, 1928, LecH-
TENSTEINISCIES ZIVILGESETSBUecH, and Panama. See Alfaro, Trust and Civil Law with Special Reference to
Panama, 33 J. Comp. LEo. & INT'L L. (3 d ser.) 25 (1952). By locating assets in these countries in trust,
a properly advised draftsman may be able to achieve effects very similar to those of an American
trust.
"' Cf. WOLFF, op. cit. supra note I, at 80-85.
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policy. The same, of course, is true in the United States, where public policy may be
used to invalidate the gift (as when promoting illegal or immoral activity) S5 or to
invalidate the condition, leaving the gift absolute (as when restricting otherwise
accepted freedom of activity)."
If, however, the testator insists on a restriction that is subject to serious question
in another state or country, there are ways of maneuvering assets and dispositions to
approximate his wishes. One device is the creation of an inter vivos trust in a juris-
diction sympathetic to the settler's desires and the exclusion of the problem from
the will altogether. In many instances, this may be the only possible way to avoid
distortion of the testamentary scheme. Alternatively, some states, to a limited extent,
have recognized the right of the testator to select the law applicable to testamentary
dispositions.87  New York's statute, for example, provides that as to assets within
New York, the testator may select the law of New York, notwithstanding his
domicile. It may, thus, be advisable in this connection to move the testator's assets
to one of these states and include such a choice-of-law provision in his will after
making certain that his dispositions are valid by the law of that state. This latter
qualification probably limits the perversion of these choice-of-law statutes to serve
the grossly peculiar quirks of a testator's mind. And even with this freedom under
a law such as the New York statute, the effect of such a bequest in other jurisdic-
tions is questionable. The validity of such a provision may not be recognized in
the courts of other states or countries, and it is possible that the distribution of assets
there may be influenced by the distribution of New York assets in a manner con-
trary to that provided by the laws of the state or country in question88 This is
particularly possible if the other state or country is that of the domicile of the
testator or of the testator and the beneficiary. 9 In such a case, the draftsman must
bear in mind that the testamentary scheme may be distorted by this retaliation in
distribution. The safest way of handling the matter, therefore, is to make certain
that all gifts comply with the different laws having possible application and to avoid
dispositions of doubtful validity under the law of any one of the states having sig-
nificant contact with the estate.
3" Ademption and Lapse of Devisees and Bequests
In addition to the post-execution contingencies previously discussed, such as
8 See In re Scott's Will, 88 Minn. 386, 93 N.W. 1o9 (1903); Hill v. Upper, ii9 Wash. 62, 204
Pac. 1055, 207 Pac. 689 (1922).
8" See Dwyer v. Kuchler, ii6 N.J. Eq. 426, i74 At. 154 (Ch. 1934); Tripp v. Payne, 339 Ill. 178,
i7i N.E. i31 (930); Meek v. Fox, 118 Va. 774, 88 S.E. i61 (i916); Knost v. Knost, 229 Mo. 170,
129 S.W. 665 (i91o); Hawke v. Enyart, 30 Neb. 149, 46 N.W. 422 (i89o).
"
7 ILL. REV. STAT. C. 3, § 89b (i953); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178 (114a) (Supp. 1955); N. Y.
D)EC. EsT. LAw § 47.
" See Caruso v. Caruso, io6 N.J. Eq. 130, 148 At. 882 (Ct. Err. & App. 1930); Van Dykes Appeal,
6o Pa. 481 (1869); McGehee v. McGehee, 152 Md. 66i, 136 At. 905 (1927); cf. Bankers Trust v.
Greims, xio Conn. 36, 147 At. 290 (1929).
80 See Griley v. Griley, 43 So.2d 350 (Fla. 1949), Murphy v. Murphy, 125 Fla. 855, 170 So. 856
(1936); In re Lawrence's Estate, 93 Vt. 424, xo8 At. 387 (i919); Cummings' Estate, 153 Pa. 397, 25
Ad. 1125 (1893); In re Olgilvie, [1918] i Ch. 492.
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revocation by operation of law on subsequent marriage or divorce, the draftsman
must anticipate many other changes in circumstances. If the draftsman does not
foresee the contingencies that may arise after the execution of a testamentary in-
strument, the testamentary scheme may well be distorted. It may happen that a
beneficiary predeceases the testator, or that the subject matter of a legacy no longer
belongs to the testator's estate at the time of his death, or that the estate is insufficient
to pay all legacies or debts. Unless the will specifically provides for such con-
tingencies, the courts apply rules which are held in store for such casesY0 These
rules, which may be aptly described as rules of stop-gap law, vary among juris-
dictions. If a legatee predeceases the testator, the legacy may lapse under the law
of one jurisdiction9' but accrue to the benefit of certain other individuals under
the law of another. 2 If surprises are to be avoided, the draftsman should consider
these stop-gap rules in the jurisdictions likely to be concerned with the testator's
estate.
The Anglo-American conflict-of-laws decisions on ademption and lapse of dis-
positions have consistently applied the traditional succession references. 3  For ex-
ample, a lapse of a devise of land is determined by the law of the situs, and
lapse of a bequest of movables by the law of the testator's domicile at death. Ademp-
tion of a devise of land, likewise, has been controlled by the situs of the land pur-
portedly devised by the will; ademption of a bequest by the law of the domicile of
the testator at death. In civil-law countries, too, the law applied is commonly that by
which the course of the succession is determined in general, including, of course,
the renvoi rulesY4
There have been few variations, but three possible approaches may raise some
doubt as to the wisdom of blind reliance on these so-called settled rules. Consider,
for example, the case of a bequest to a legatee who resides elsewhere than at the
testator's domicile, where the legatee predeceases the testator, but the legatee's will
disposes of his residuary to someone other than his intestate successors. The usual
rule would apply the law of the testator's domicile to determine if there is a lapse.
" See Ashburner v. Macquire, 2 Bro. C. C. io8, 29 Eng. Rep. 62 (1786); Owcn v. Busiel, 83 N.H.
345, 142 At. 692 (1928); Harvard Unitarian Soc'y v. Tufts, 151 Mass. 76, 23 N.E. ioo6 (i89o); More-
house v. Bridgeport City Trust Co., 137 Conn. 209, 75 A.2d 493 (i95o); In re Spier's Estate, 224 Mich.
658, 195 N.W. 430 (923); In re Hall's Estate, 183 Cal. 61, 19o Pac. 364 (1920); May v. Burns, 222
Ala. 68, 13r, So. 232 (930). See also Mechem, Specific Legacies of Unspecific Things, 87 U. PA.
L. REV. 546 (1939); Page, Ademption by Extinction, 1943 'Wis. L. REv. 1i; Warren, History of Ademp-
tlion, 25 IowA L. REv. 29o (1940); Mechem, Problems Under Anti-Lapse Statutes, 19 IowA L. REv. I
(1933).
"' E.g., a bequest to a sister who predeceased the testator would lapse under a statute referring only
to descendants of the testator. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 61, § 16 (1940); ARIz. CoDE ANN. § 41-109
(939).
- E.g., a bequest to a deceased sister would not lapse under a statute referring to any legatees or to
any kindred. See, e.g., CAL. PRoB. CODE § 92 (1949); VA. CODE § 64-64 (1950).
"In re Dublin's Estate, 375 Pa. 599, io1 A.2d 731 (954); Phillips v. Phillips, 213 Ala. 27, 104
So. 234 (1925); Lowndes v. Cooch, 7 Md. 478, 39 At. 1045 (1898); In re Cohn, [1945] Ch. 5; In re
Cunnington, [1924] 1 Ch. 68. See Note, Anti-Lapse Statutes and the Confict of Laws, 47 YALE L. J.
1216 (1938). Cf. Eisenschenk v. Fowler, 82 So.2d 876 (Fla. 1955).
"See note 48 supra et seq.
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If the testator's domicile has an antilapse statute, the gift goes over to the legatee's
estate,95 or lineal descendants,96 or passes as if the legatee survived the testator,
9 7
depending on the particular lapse statute in effect. Who can claim and under what
law? The variation in lapse statutes suggests the possibility that while the testator's
domicile determines that there is no lapse, the domicile of the legatee may determine
the identity of the person who takes the bequest as substituted legatee. This would
bring into operation a law not included within the traditional conflict-of-laws refer-
ences.98
A second situation that may raise some doubt as to the settled nature of the con-
flict rules relating to ademption is that in which the testator includes in his will a
devise of land in a state other than his domicile, but conveys it away prior to his
death. Most of the statutes preventing ademption are drafted in terms of contracts
to convey, but some have been extended to the situation in which the land has
been conveyed.99 The usual choice-of-law rule permits the questions to be de-
termined by the law of the situs. °0 0 This works well when the land is still in the
testator's estate, though subject to a contract to sell. However, determining the
disposition of a testator's assets by the law of the situs of land previously conveyed
and no longer in the estate seems questionable. This is particularly so if the pro-
ceeds of the sale are located in another state which would characterize them as
movables.
A third qualification may be suggested on the basis of two strong policies in the
area of testation. The doctrines preventing lapse and ademption are subject to the
testator's intention. There is considerable authority and some reason to determine
questions of intention by the laws of either the testator's domicile at the time of
execution of the will or the place of execution, rather than by the law of his domicile
at death.' In addition, the statutes preventing lapse and ademption are probably
responsive to family protection policies applicable to succession and are a means of
protecting the descendants of legatees who are close members of the testator's
" See, e.g., Matter of Penrose, 164 Misc. 388, 2z99 N.Y. Supp. 844 (Surr. Ct. 1937); cf. R. I. GEN.
LAws c. 566, § 30 (X938).
"See, e.g., S. D. CoDE § 56.0232 (i939); ILL. REV. STAT. C. 3, § 49 (953).
"See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. C. 169, § io (i954).
0See, e.g., the complications as to this in Matter of Penrose, 164 Misc. 388, 229 N.Y. Supp. 844
(Surr. Ct. 1937). This law of the legatee's domicile may be contemplated in an application of renvoi
doctrines. Cf. Matter of Battell, 286 N.Y. 97, 35 N.E.2d 913 (194I); In re Winslow's Estate, 138 Misc.
672, 247 N.Y. Supp. 506 (Surr. Ct. 1930).
" See, e.g., Phillips v. Phillips, 213 Ala. 27, 104 So. 234 (1925); cf. Dwyer's Estate, 159 Cal.
664, 115 Pac. 235 (1911).
100 See, e.g., Phillips v. Phillips, supra note 99.
" Higinbotham v. Manchester, 113 Conn. 62, 154 Ad. 242 (1931); Houghton v. Hughes, io8 Me.
233, 79 At. 909 (i9iz); Keith v. Eaton, 58 Kan. 732, 51 Pac. 271 (897); Staigg v. Atkinson, 144 Mass.
564, 12 N.E. 354 (1887); Matter of Dialogue, 159 Misc. 18, 287 N.Y. Supp. 237 (Surr. Ct. X936); CHEsxnus,
op. cit. supra note I, at 562-66. See also Herring, Is the Construction of Wills Devising Real Estate
Governed by the Rules of Construction of the Domicile of the Testator or by the Rules of Situs of the
Property?, 4 Ams. L. REG. (n.s.) 62.3 (1902).
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family. °2 This suggests that the state of the testator's domicile at death well could
be considered the state having the dominant interest in the family, and, consequently,
that its policy should determine lapse and ademption questions in cases of im-
movables as well as movables.
It is fortunate that the problems of ademption and lapse are subject to expressions
of the testator's intention, for, this is the only reasonably safe solution. The drafts-
man should cover the matter in the testamentary instrument by setting out well-
formulated rules for these various foreseeable contingencies. It is also possible that
an express, choice-of-law clause would incorporate by reference a governing law under
the intention doctrine. While this latter method may be effective, it probably is less
safe than setting out a lapse and ademption clause in the will.
4. Terms of Special Meaning and Their Construction
Another problem of determining the intention of the testator is raised when the
testator uses words of special meaning. For example, in a gift to "the children of
X," the term "children" may or may not include any of the following categories of
individuals: legitimate children, illegitimate children, grandchildren, adopted chil-
dren, legitimated children, foster children, recognized illegitimate children, etc.
The meaning given to the term may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The
same observation applies to such terms as "my money," "my effects," "to the heirs of,"
"die without issue," "heirs," or "issue," and the like. It is often indicated that the
faw governing the succession will determine these questions of construction;1
03
nevertheless, there are deviations from the traditional rules. For example, it may be
urged that the "heirs" or "children" of a legatee are to be determined by the personal
law of the legatee rather than the law generally determining the course of the
succession. 0 4 Likewise, many courts have used the law of the testator's domicile
at the time of execution rather than at death to determine such questions. " In any
case of a single will, the concept of a universal disposition may cause the situs to
prefer the law of the last domicile on such questions.' The existence of these
possibilities indicates that the predictability of the result is questionable.
In all such cases, therefore, it is necessary for the draftsman to consider the
meaning which is given to such terms by the rules of authoritative explanation of
every jurisdiction in question. The alternative is the difficult one of so clearly
102 This at least appears to be an important policy in the statutes referring to children or lineal
descendants of the testator. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. c. 3, § 49 (1953); INo. ANN. STAT. § 6-6oi
(Burns 1953).
105E.g., Simmons v. O'Connor, 149 S.W.2d 1107 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); Peet v. Peet, 229 IIL 41,
82 N.E. 376 (1907); Jennings v. Jennings, 21 Ohio St. 56 (x87); see In re Osborn's Estate, x5i
Misc. 52, 270 N.Y. Supp. 616 (Surr. Ct. 1934). See also Casner, The Construction of Gilts to "Heirs"
and the Like, 53 HARv. L. R~v. 207 (1939).
104 See note 88 supra.
... See note io supra.
100 See WOLFF, op. cit. supra note 1, at 591; cf. In re Peabody's Estate, 115 N.Y.S.2d 337 (Sup. Ct.
1952); In re Ruperti's Estate, 194 Misc. 376, 86 N.Y.S.2d 887 (Surr. Ct. 1949); In re Bernie's Estate, 74
N.Y.S.2d 887 (Surr. Ct. 1947); Matter of Gato, 276 App. Div. 651, 97 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1st Dep't 295o).
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defining these terms that no controversy can conceivably arise with respect to their
meaning.
5. Gifts to Aliens or Residents of Foreign Countries
Different governmental attitudes regarding taxation, inheritance, and private prop-
erty in other countries may often intervene to thwart the accomplishment of the
testator's intention. There appears to be serious question whether beneficiaries
living in some foreign countries would ever receive the benefit of a bequest, even if
sent to them, because of governmental confiscation under nationalization acts, foreign
exchange controls, or the guise of taxation.' This danger is not limited to foreign
nationals, but will apply to United States citizens as well where foreign currency
controls provide for redemption of foreign credits at reduced rates of exchange"0 ,
or where there is doubt that even a check will reach an addressee' 9 Particular
difficulties can arise when the intended beneficiary is a citizen or resident of a country
which becomes involved in war with the United States. In such cases, the bequest
may simply be forfeited to the United States Alien Property Custodian °
In most of these situations, therefore, it would seem advisable to establish a
trust with sufficient discretion and directions to the trustees to provide for alternative
dispositions in the event such obstacles to distribution should arise. Such alternative
dispositions would also avoid the impounding of such bequests, as is possible under
statutes in several of our states,"' but would enable some program of the testator
to be carried out.
In any case in which assets are located abroad, or where a beneficiary is a citizen
or resident of a foreign country, or even when the testator himself is an alien or
resident of a foreign country, it is indispensable for the draftsman to find out whether
any treaty exists between the United States and the country in question and what
any such treaty provides with respect to decedents' estates." 2 While the treaty may
.0. See Petition of Mazurowski, 331 Mass. 33, 116 N.E.ad 854 (1954); In re Url's Estate, 7 N.J.
Super. 455, 7 A.2d 665 (County Ct. 1950); In re Mucll's Estate, X74 Misc. 35, 19 N.Y.S.2d OO9 (Surr.
Ct. 1940); In re Bold's Estate, 173 Misc. 545, I8 N.Y.S.2d 291 (Surr. Ct. 1940); In re Landau's Estate,
172 Misc. 651, 16 N.Y.S.2d 3 (Surr. Ct. 1939); In re Blasi's Estate, 172 Misc. 587, 15 N.Y.S.2d 682
(Surr. Ct. 1939); In re Weidberg's Estate, 172 Misc. 524, 15 N.Y.S.2d 252 (Surr. Ct. 1939).
... Cf. Petition of Mazurowski, supra note 107.
I" See 37 C.F.R. § 21.3 (Supp. 1955), where it is provided: "Withholding of delivery of checks or
warrants. (a) The Secretary of the Treasury hereby determines that postal transportation, or banking
facilities in general or local conditions in Albania, Bulgaria, Communist-controlled China, Czechoslovakia,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania. Poland, Rumania, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the
Russian Zone of Occupation of Germany, and the Russian Sector of Occupation of Berlin, Germany are
such that there is not a reasonable assurance that a payee in those areas will actually receive checks or
warrants drawn against funds of the United States, or agencies or instrumentalities thereof, and be able
to negotiate the same for full value."
1.. Trading With Enemy Act, 40 STAT. 415 (1917), 5o App. U.S.C. § 6 (1952). See also World
War II Alien Property Custodian Regulations, Exec. Order No. 9095, 7 FED. REo. X971 (942), as
amended, Exec. Order No. 9193, 7 id. at 5205 (1942), Exec. Order No. 9567, 7O id. at 6917 (1945).
.. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3 A: 25-10 (1953); N.Y. SURs. CT. Acr. § 269 (as amended 1939); MAss.
GEN. LAws c. 206, § 27 A (as amended 1950).
112 Cf. S. A. BAYITCH, CONFLIcT LAW IN THE UNsmo STATES TREATIES 82 (1955); Hyning, Treaty
Law for the Private Practitioner, 23 U. Cm. L. REv. 36 (1955).
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not determine how property will be disposed of, it may well indicate the limits
of testation or grant the foreign consular officials rights to represent the foreign
citizen in our courts. In the latter event, the difficulty of avoiding confiscation by
the foreign government may be increased.
IV
PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION
A. Preliminary Observations
Every legal system has to provide some kind of proceedings by which the gen-
uineness and validity of an instrument purporting to be the will of a decedent can
authoritatively be ascertained. While both probate and adminstration, as we know
them, are institutions peculiar to the common law, numerous civil-law countries also
provide machinery for the authoritative determination of heirship, testate and
intestate. However, under the traditional civil-law approach, it is not necessary for
a will first formally to be admitted to public record before it is used for legal pur-
poses. Although this traditional approach has been modified widely and in several
different ways, it is important for the American lawyer to know that in the case
of a foreign decedent having assets in this country, it may not always be possible
to procure that kind of official document which would correspond to the decree of
probate of a court of a common-law jurisdiction.
Administration of an estate by an executor can, in all civil-law countries, be
ordered in his will by any testator.13 A testator is likely to do so if he expects that
the winding-up of his estate will present special difficulties. But where administra-
tion has not thus been provided for by the testator, it will not take place unless it is
necessitated by extraordinary conditions, such as insolvency of the estate or justified
reason to doubt the heir's reliability or ability properly to wind up the estate. In the
regular course of events, tide to all assets of the estate, both real and personal, passes
directly from the decedent to his "heir" or "heirs." In the case of intestacy, the
heirs are those persons who are so indicated by the intestacy statute of the country
in question. In the case of testate succession, no exact common-law counterpart
... For the civil law analogues to probate and administration, see Rheinstein, European Methods for
Liquidation o1 Debts of Deceased Persons, 2o IOWA L. REv. 431 (1935); FOREIGN LAW SERIES No. 4,
ADnNISTEATION OF ESTATES IN ENGLAND, U.S.A., AND FRANCE WITH RESPECT TO ASSETS ABROAD (x935);
L. T. BATES, FRENCH PROBATE AND ADmsINISTRIATION PRACTICE IN RELATION TO ESTATES OF AMERICAN
DECEDENTS (193r); E. L. BURGIN, ADMINISTRATION OF FOREIGN ESTATES (193); H. EMMERICH, ESTATE
PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES AND EURoPE (1950); P. PELLERIN, THE FRENCH LAW OF WILLS,
PROBATE, ADMINISTRATION, AND DEATH DUTIES OF THE ESTATES OF ENGLISH DECEDENTS LEAVING PROP-
ERTY IN FRANCE (3d ed. r933); Bauln, Disposal over German Estates by a British Executor, 18 J.
Comp. LEG. & INT'L LAW 289 (1936); Baty, Probating a Foreign Will, L. MAG. & REV. 220 (1913);
Brown, French Practice of Administration of Estates, 3 INT'L & Comp. L. Q. 624 (954); Wormser
and Burchard, Administration of German Decedents" Estate, 83 U. PA. L. RLV. 37 (1934); ARTInI
NussBAuSE, A MRiCAN-SWISS PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (Bilateral Studies in Private International
Law No. I, [95i); GEORGES R. DELAUME, AMERICAN-FRENCH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (Bilateral
Studies in Private International Law No. 2, 1953); R. D. KOLLEWIJN, AMERICAN-DUTCH PRIVATE INTER-
NATIONAL LAW (Bilateral Studies in Private International Law No. 3, 1955); MARTIN DOME, AmERICAN-
GERmAN PRIVATE LAW RELATIONS (Bilateral Studies in Private International Law No. 4, 1956).
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exists to those persons who are called "heirs" in the civil law. The closest common-
law equivalent to the civil-law heir is our residuary legatee. Those persons whose
status corresponds to that of general or specific legatees or devisees usually have but
personal claims against the heir or heirs.
The duty to pay the debts of the decedent is incumbent upon the heir. if
the assets of the estate are insufficient, he has to pay from his own pocket. To
avoid this potentially grave responsibility, two alternatives are open to the per-
son who is called to heirship by the intestacy law or the will. He can refuse to accept
the heirship, which then devolves upon the person next in order. The declaration
of refusal to accept heirship is usually required to be made in a notarial instrument
and to be filed with the proper court. If heirship is declined by all persons succes-
sively called, it ultimately devolves upon the state, which is never liable for the debts,
however, beyond the value of the assets actually received.
If the person called to heirship has accepted or simply failed timely to refuse ac-
ceptance, he can still limit his liability to either the assets of the estate or to their
money value. All he had to do for this purpose under the Corpus Juris was to make
an inventory of the estate and file it with the proper court. Such is still the law
in many countries, especially those following the pattern of the French Civil Code.
But under the German Code and those others which follow its model, the heir has
to ask the proper court to initiate formal proceedings of administration and then
hand over the assets of the estate to the administrator who will be appointed by the
court. Administration of this kind will, of course, occur but rarely.
Exceptions to the general scheme exist in Austria and several other countries,
where, as a general rule, every estate has to go through administration under the
control of a court or other public agency. Under the impact of common-law influ-
ences, administration of the Anglo-American pattern takes place as a regular feature
of succession in South Africa and Rhodesia, as well as in Quebec.
The American attorney who has to draft a will intended to affect assets situated
in civil-law jurisdictions should, thus, consider that the treatment of these assets may
differ considerably from that which he may be inclined to regard as the only
possible one. Because of the direct passing of the tide to the heir or heirs, conflict
problems of administration will not arise as regularly as they do in common-law
countries. But if there arises a problem of liability for debts or taxes, it is likely to
be complicated. Systematic investigation of administration problems in the relation
to civil-law countries has hardly been undertaken so far. The following discussion
will, thus, concentrate upon the problems arising among common-law jurisdictions.
B. Place of Administration
Conflict-of-laws problems incident to the administration of a decedent's estate
nearly always arise because of the location of assets within a particular state or
nation. If a person owns property in a particular jurisdiction, he must face the
possibility of administration being required there after his death. Thus, it becomes
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important to know where assets are subject to being administered, and then some
attempt can be made to discuss ways of reducing the possibilities of administration
at more than one place.
The location of land, for the purposes of administration, is mostly easily de-
termined. The immovable must be administered or not administered by the law
of the situs.114 The initial problem of characterization of the document of title or
contract asset will come before the court within whose territorial jurisdiction the
document or parties are located. But even here, if the interest is characterized as
being an immovable, the situs law will govern;"" and ultimately some action may
be required at the situs, if only to take the necessary steps to make the record reflect
the status of the asserted ownership."'
The location of movables, for the purpose of administration, is more complicated.
A chattel is generally subject to the law of administration of the place where it
happens to be located at the time the decedent dies."' Often the law of a particular
jurisdiction will permit the removal of assets without administration if they are only
temporarily within the state and the removal is to the state of the decedent's
domicile or the place where the chattel in question is customarily kept."'
The problem of determining the place of administration of intangibles probably
has the most significance for estate planners, since the bulk of wealth is usually
represented by intangible assets. In the United States, nonnegotiable debts and
causes of action are subject to administration as assets of the estate wherever juris-
diction over the defendant debtor can be obtained for purposes of suit to collect."O
Location of an estate debtor or the debtor's property, for jurisdictional purposes, is a
matter scarcely within the control of the decedent and peculiarly beyond the reach
of the estate planner. The possible places of administration of intangibles repre-
sented by negotiable instruments or specialties are, however, subject to more
definite control and prediction.' This is probably also the case of corporate shares.
Those interests which are chattelized in the paper representing them, to such an
extent that the paper embodies the interest for most ownership purposes, are gen-
11 E.g., Prescott v. Durfee, 131 Mass. 477 (1881), Sprayberry v. Culberson, 32 Ga. 299 (1861).
... See, e.g., In re Berchtold, [1923] i Ch. x92; In re Cutcliffe's Will Trusts, 11940] 1 Ch. 565.
It may be that the characterization will have to be made according to the law of the situs of the land
involved in the transaction. See Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186 (xgoo); WOLFF, Op. cit. su1pra note i, at
504, 570.
... Cf. Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. I (I9O9); Matson v. Matson, 186 Iowa 607, 173 N.W. 127 (1919).
See also Mallette v. Scheerer, 164 Wis. 415, 16o N.W. 182 (i9i6).
"" Cf. Morrison v. Hass, 229 Mass. 514, 118 N.E. 893 (x918); Cox v. Kansas City, 86 Kan. 298,
120 Pac. 553 (1912); Parnell v. Thompson, 81 Kan. I19, io5 Pac. 502 (199o).
... E.g., Christy v. Vest, 36 Iowa 285 (1873). See also GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note i, at 537.
.. Furst v. Brady, 375 Ill. 425, 31 N.E.2d 6o6 (940); Gordon v. Shca, 3oo Mass. 95, 14 N.E.2d
105 (1938); State ex rel C. B. & Q. R. Co. v. Probate Court, 149 Minn. 464, 184 N.W. 43 (1921);
Saunders v. Weston, 74 Me. 85 (1882); see also Harris v. Balk, r98 U.S. 215 (19o5); cl. Rheinstein, Die
inlaendische Bedeutung einer auslaendischen Zwangsvollstrcckung in Geldforderungen, 8 ZEsrscsssrr F.
Aust. U. INTERN. PRIVATRECHT 277 (1934).
-
0 See Smith v. Normart, 51 Ariz. 134, 75 P.2d 38 (1938); Lang's Estate, 301 Pa. 429, 152 Atd.
570 (1930); Toner v. Conqueror Trust Co., 131 Kan. 651, 293 Pac. 745 (1930); Iowa v. Slimmer, 248
U.S. i5 (i918).
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erally subject to administration where the paper is located.' 2 The paper is subject
to the owner's control and its location most easily planned. Corporate shares are
usually, but not always, completely transferable by endorsement and delivery of the
certificate.' If transferable only on the books of the corporation, the traditional
conflicts rule permits administration at the place of incorporation of the issuing
company. 23  Since the location of assets is the most useful variable for the estate
planner, it is well to keep the location possibilities in mind as various problems of
administration are discussed.
Initial administration should be started at the domicile of the deceased, except
in rare cases. The domicile is usually the one place at which a will can be probated,
even though there are no assets within the jurisdiction of the domiciliary court.'24
Prompt administration at the domicile may be important for several purposes. First,
the domiciliary personal representative is often entitled to preference in appointment
in other states as ancillary administrator. Second, the domiciliary probate and con-
struction of the will is often decisive of similar questions elsewhere. Third, prompt
action by the domiciliary personal representative may make it possible to avoid
administration in other states. Fourth, the principal administration at the domicile
usually receives surplus movable assets from ancillary administrations for purposes
of final distribution to the ultimate beneficiaries.
The significance of the domicile in estate planning is such that any circumstances
suggesting the possibility of dual findings of domicile should be avoided. This not
only precludes the probate confusion of conflicting findings of domicile,'25 but also
the problems of potential double taxation, such as arose in the Dorrance case.126
121 RESTAT ENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 477 (1934); Lohman v. Kansas City So. Ry., 326 Mo. 868,
33 S.W. 2d 117 (1930); Griswold v. Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 94 N.J. Eq. 308, 12o Atl. 324 (Ch.
1916); Lockwood v. United States Steel Corp., 209 N.Y. 375, 103 N.E. 697 (1913), In re Miller's
Estate, 90 Kan. 819, 136 Pac. 255 (1913); Russell v. Hooker, 67 Conn. 24, 34 At. 7, (895). Contra,
Kennedy v. Hodges, 215 Mass. 112, io2 N.E. 432 (913); Gamble v. Dawson, 67 Wash. 72, 120 Pac.
io6o (I952); Murphy v. Crouse, 135 Cal. 14, 66 Pac. 971 (i9oi); Grayson v. Robertson, 122 Ala. 330,
25 So. 229 (1899); cf. Crane v. Crane, 373 Pa. 1, 95 A.2d 199 (1953); Krizanek v. Smith, 32 Del.
513, 87 A.ad 871 (1952). See also GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note r, at 545-48; DrcEY, op. cit. supra
note I, at 305; CHESHIRE, op. cit. stpra note I, at 51o. For a thorough discussion, see Hopkins,
Conflict of Laws in Administration of Decedents' Intangibles, 28 IOWA L. Rav. 422, 613 (1943);
Pomerance, The "Situs" of Stock, 17 CORNELL L. Q. 43 (1931).
122The Uniform Stock Transfer Act has been adopted by all the states in the United States. See
6 U.L.A. 6 (Supp. 1955).
'Albuquerque Nat'l Bk. v. Citizens Nat'l Bk., 212 F.-d 943 (5th Cir. 1954); Kennedy v. Hodges,
215 Mass. 212, io2 N.E. 432 (1913).
... Sce Wolf v. Gills, 96 Okla. 6, 219 Pac. 350 (1923); Holburn v. Pfanmiller's Adm'r, 114 Ky. 831,
71 S.W. 940 (1903); cf. Flath v. Neal, 63 Ariz. 68, L59 P.2d 617 (1945). See also WOLFF, op. cit.
supra note I. at 6o6; DicE., op. cit. supra note I, at 3o2; CHESHIRE, op. cit. su pra note I, at 5o8.
"'2See Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343 (1941); Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U.S.
394 (1017); Overby v. Gordon, 177 U.S. 214 (19oo).
12. The Dorrance litigation is reflected in the following opinions: Hill v. Martin, 296 U.S. 393
(1935); In re Dorrance's Estate, 116 NJ. Eq. 204, 172 At. 503 (Prerog. Ct. 1934); In re Dorrance's
Estate, 115 N.J. Eq. 268, 17o Ad. 6or (Prerog. Ct. 1934); In re Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 163
At. 303 (1932); New Jersey v. Pennsylvania, 287 U.S. 58o (1932). See also, Texas v. Florida, 306
U.S. 398 (i939); Worcester County Trust v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292 (1937). The problem is explored
in the article by Twetd and Sargent, Death and Taxes are Certain-but What of Domicile?, 53 HARV. L.
REv. 68 (1939).
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In this regard, the concept of domicile, as understood in the laws of the different
jurisdictions involved, should be considered. If the client is unable or unwilling to
arrange his personal and family affairs to avoid the problem of dual domicile, at
least his assets should be so located as to mitigate the effect of the possible conflicting
finding. For example, if confronted with the situation in the Dorrance case, it
would be preferable to have nearly all the assets located in one of the "domiciliary"
states, preferably that state with the stronger claim-and perhaps the lower tax
rate. 2 Since the impasse in binding two states to one finding of domicile can be
avoided by getting the two states to litigate in the same court, voluntary tax pay-
ments probably should not be made. Rather, the state which has insufficient assets
to cover its tax claim should be forced to sue in the courts of the other. In such a
case, the concept of submission to jurisdiction is effective, and the one domicile
determination probably binding at least as to the major portion of the assets.1 21
If the state without assets does not take prompt action in the courts of the state
having assets, distribution of the assets by the latter court would probably protect
the distributees under doctrines of due process and full faith and credit.1 2 9
In regard to the problem of multiple taxation, reciprocal exemption statutes have
been adopted in most of the states of the United States, and treaties offer substantial
protection in the international area."' In either case, the statute or treaty must, of
course, be considered in anticipating the post-mortem effect of dispositions and the
location of the testator's assets.
Even without regard to the problems of taxation, there is considerable reason
to avoid multiple administrations. Consequently, the estate owner must, as he
handles his affairs during life, constantly be aware of the problems that may possibly
be occasioned by the location of his assets. When faced with the fact of location of
assets in different jurisdictions after the testator's death, however, there are still some
opportunities open for avoiding ancillary administration. If possession of non-
domiciliary assets can be obtained by the domiciliary personal representative by
voluntary surrender or payment before ancillary administration is begun, the courts
will probably recognize such payment, and the jurisdictional basis for ancillary
administration is removed. 3 ' Since administration is usually in the hands of some-
12' it may be- more of an advantage to have substantial assets in neither "domiciliary" state and
to force both to claim assets in a third, neutral forum. This would be a highly unusual situation in the
location of assets.
128 See Matter of Trowbridge, 226 N.Y. 283, 194 N.E. 756 (1935). See also, Curry v. McCanless,
307 U.S. 357 (939); Matter of Benjamin, 176 Misc. 518, 27 N.Y.S.2d 948 (Surr. Ct. 1941), afl'd,
263 App. Div. 981, 34 NXY.S.2d 394 (ist Dep't 1942), all'd, 289 N.Y. 5-34, 43 N.E.2d 531 (1942).
...See Tilt v. Kelsey, 207 U.S. 43 (9o7); Overby v. Gordon, 177 U.S. 214 (19oo).
..0 Statutes have been adopted in thirty-two states providing for reciprocal exemption of intangible
personal property of nonresident decedents. See P-H INit. & TRANS. TAX SERv. 851 (2956). Treaties
designed to avoid multiple estate taxation in the international area are in effect between the United States
and Australia, Belgium, Canada, Eire, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, the
Union of South Africa, and the United Kingdom. See 4-A P-H 1956 FED. TAX SERv. 128,011.
.. See Maas v. German Savings Bank, 176 N.Y. 377, 68 N.E. 658 (1903); Wilkins v. Ellett, o8
U.S. 256 (2883); cf. Petersen v. The Chemical Bank, 32 N.Y. 21 (1865); Leake v. Gilchrist, 13 N.C.
48, 2 Dev. 73 (1830); Grignon v. Shope, ioo Ore. 611, 197 Pac. 317 (1921). See also Beale, Voluntary
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one sympathetic to the efficient administration of the whole estate, it is often
only necessary to persuade debtors of the estate to pay without suit and to persuade
persons interested in the estate not to petition for ancillary letters. Prompt assurance
to creditors of fair treatment of their claims, if filed at the domicile, will usually be
sufficient to prevent them from petitioning for ancillary administration." 2
Voluntary payment or collection of assets is not the only means of avoiding
ancillary administration. Some states authorize foreign personal representatives to
sue in their courts if no local administration has been taken out.13 3 This procedure
enables the domiciliary personal representative to proceed with interstate liquidation,
even if the parties are unwilling to settle the matter voluntarily. Wider adoption
of these statutes would enable considerable savings of time, money, and effort in
multistate administration. It must, of course, be borne in mind that whatever is
done must be in accordance with the law of the place where the assets in question
are located. This means that a thorough consideration of the administrative
statutes of each such jurisdiction is indispensable in multistate administration.
When assets are located in a foreign country or left by a foreign national in the
United States, treaties may provide direction, or the consular officials of the country
of the decedents' domicile or nationality may be entitled to administer.'"
If ancillary administration is necessary, the domiciliary representative should apply
for it. Under the statutes of many states, the domiciliary administrator will be
entitled to priority in appointment. 3 ' Having the same person administering the
estate in different jurisdictions aids in handling the assets as a unit in the manner
intended by the testator. Because of limitations upon corporate fiduciaries or others,
or because of the state's policy to provide business for its public administrator, how-
ever, it may not be possible to have the same representative in each jurisdiction,3 6
but sympathetic representatives having a common interest are most beneficial.
C. Proof of Will and Contests
In the testamentary estate, the will should ordinarily first be probated at the
domicile. Admission of the will to probate at the domicile usually precludes contests
Payment to a Foreign Administrator, 42 H~atv. L. REV. 597 (1929); Mersch, Voluntary Payment to
Foreign Administrator, i8 GEo. L. J. 130 (930). But see WOLFF, op. cit. supra note i, at 607 as to
the English authorities.
"2 See Putnam v. Pitney, 45 Minn. 242, 47 N.W. 790 (i89x); cf. In re Williams' Estate, 130
Iowa 553, 107 N.W. 6o8 (xgo6); COLO. REv. STAr. § 152-6-5 (1953); FLA. STAT. § 734-30 (3) (4)
(1953); ILL. REv. STAT C. 3, § 262 (1953)-
.. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 152-6-4 (1953); FLA. STAT. § 734.30 (2) (3) (I953); ILL. REV. STAT.
c. 3, § 265 (1953). But see WOLFF, op. cit. supra note i, at 607, as to the English practice.
"3 See, e.g., treaties with: Argentina, July 27, 1853, art. IX, 1o STAT. 1OO9; Austria, June i9,
1928, art. IV, 47 STAT. 1879; Germany, Dec. 8, 1923, art. IV, 44 STAT. 2135; Great Britain, March
2, 1899, art. I, II, III, 3x STAr. 1939; and Italy, Feb. 2, 1948, art. II, III, IV, 63 STAT. 2258. See
also Hynning, Treaty Law for the Private Practitioner, 23 U. Cm. L. REv. 36, 73 (1955); BAYiTO-, op.
cit. supra note 112.
.. E.g., ARx. STAT. ANN. § 62-3104 (Supp. 1955); FLA. STAT. § 734.31 (953); IowA CODE § 633-50
Se954).
... See, e.g., FLA. STAr. § 660.10 (19.53); KAN. GEN. ST*AT. § 59-7o6 (0949).
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elsewhere as to movables. 117  This is a result of the law governing succession of
movables under Anglo-American law.13' This will not, however, under the law
governing validity, determine validity as to immovables,3'3 although it may have
that effect under an act such as the Foreign Wills Act, in that the content of the law
of the domicile as to this will is established. 4 ° There is also the possibility that the
situs court of immovables will bar further contest on similar issues under similar
law by the doctrines of res judicata.' 4' Because of an in rem concept of probate and
administration jurisdiction, the doctrines of full faith and credit are probably not
yet applicable to findings of validity of the will.' Nondomiciliary contests probably
have no effect beyond the assets before the court hearing the litigation, although
it is possible that the more personal aspects of res judicata, such as collateral estoppel,
might apply.
14
Another advantage of prompt probate of the will at the domicile involves the
effect of a will construction by the courts in the domicile. The conflicts rules here
are an interesting, though somewhat confusing, combination of choice of law and
res judicata. In cases involving movables, the construction by the domicile is given
effect as the most pertinent expression of what the governing law has to say about
the case at hand. In addition, alternative references in construction may be fore-
closed by concepts of res judicata.'" While the effect of a domiciliary construction
upon a question of immovables at the court of the situs is not controlling as often
as in the case of movables, it still is significant. The situs court may adopt the
domiciliary construction by reason of its choice of law relating to construction of
documents,'" or by reason of a foreign execution statute, 46 or by reason of doctrines
"'See Lee v. Monks, 318 Mass. 513, 6z N.E.2d 657 (1945); Martin v. Stovall, 103 Tenn. 1, 52
S.W. 296 (18g9); In re Orrantia's Estate, 36 Ariz. 31X, 285 Pac. 266 (1930); Rackemann v. Taylor,
204 Mass. 394, go N.E. 552 (1910).
1.. See RESTATEIMENT, CONFLIcT OF LAws § 470 (1) 0934); GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note I. at
525; cf. Evansville Ice and Cold Storage Co. v. Winsor, 148 Ind. 682, 48 N.E. 592 (1897); Ies v.
Salisbury's Heirs, 56 Vt. 565 (1884).
133 Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U. S. 186 (igoo); In re Barrie's Estate, 240 Iowa 431, 35 N.W.2d 658
('949); Hofferd v. Coyle, 212 Ind. 52o, 8 N.E.2d 827 (1937).
140 See Crippen v. Dexter, 79 Mass. 330 (859). See note 14 supra for citations of statutes recognizing
wills valid under the law of the place of execution or some personal law of the testator.
.. See In re Hunter's Estate, Igo Okla. 284, 122 P.2d 1017 (1942); Loewenthal v. Mandell, 125
Fla. 685, 170 So. x69 (1936); Quinton v. Kendall, 122 Kan. 814, 253 Pac. 6oo (1927); Hopper v.
Nicholas, io6 Ohio St. 292, 14o N.E. z86 (1922); Willett's Appeal, 5o Conn. 330 (1882). See also
Roach v. Jurchak, 182 Md. 646, 35 At. 1817 (1944); Bryon v. Nash, iio Va. 329, 66 S.E. 69 (199o).
See also Hopkins, The Extra-territorial Effect of Probate Decrees, 53 YALE L. J. 221 (x944). A different
result may be reached in suits not concerning validity of a will or disposition. See Ingersoll v. Coram,
211 U. S. 335 (igo8).
...See Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343 (1942); Baker v. Baker, Eccles Co., 242 U.S.
394 (1917); Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186 (igoo); cf. Ingersoll v. Coram, supra note 141.
143 See Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 ('939); cf. Riley v. New York Trust Co.,
supra note 142.
... See Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., supra note 143.
'"See, e.g., note rot supra. See also Simmons v. O'Connor, 149 S.W.2d 1107 (Tex. Civ. App.
1941).
... See Crippen v. Dexter, 79 Mass. 330 (1859).
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of res judicata and the concept of unitary succession. 47 From these cases, it appears
that the domiciliary construction may well have the effect of reducing litigation
elsewhere and providing a basis for uniform handling of the estate.
D. Creditors' Claims and Their Payment
One of the primary purposes of administration is to pay the debts of the deceased
so that assets of the estate may be distributed free of any incumbrance. This purpose
is reflected in the policy of affording creditors a reasonable opportunity to present
their claims and, if the claim is valid, to receive payment. The usual procedure is to
require a creditor to file his claim in writing with the personal representative or the
probate court. The claim is then verified and paid or denied by the personal repre-
sentative. If denied, the creditor brings suit to establish the claim. Claims must
be filed within a specified period of time under the statutes of the different states
before they can be considered for payment. This period of time limitations is
called the nonclaim period and usually is not subject to extension or waiver by the
representative or the court0 4s
Anglo-American law generally permits both local and foreign creditors to file in
administration at either the domicile or elsewhere.-" Under the in rem concept of
jurisdiction, a claim may well be filed in more than one jurisdiction. While payment
by one representative discharges the debt, rejection or allowance of a claim as to
validity in one jurisdiction usually has not been given effect in other jurisdictions.' 50
The conflict-of-laws doctrine in this area is not fully developed and, as yet, tends
to be provincial. The claim procedure is usually characterized as procedural, and
only the local law of the forum is applied. While actual litigation between one
administrator and a creditor may not bar relitigation of the same claim with another
administrator, however,' 5 ' there is some evidence that courts may refuse to permit
a domiciliary creditor to file a claim after the nonclaim period has expired at the
domicile."x 2 But the courts have substantially recognized the unity of the estate
only when the estate is insolvent. In the case of insolvency, creditors in all states
"See Keith v. Eaton, 58 Kan. 732, 51 Pac. 271 (1897). See also WOLFF, op. cit. supra note i,
at 591, and note io6 supra.
4' See ToMs E. ATKINSON, WILLS 687 et seq. (2d ed. 1953).
"' E.g., In re Hirsch's Estate, 146 Ohio St. 393, 66 N.E.2d 636 (1946); Coffey v. Durand, 27
Tenn. App. 704, x67 S.W.2d 684 (1940); Toner v. Conqueror Trust Co., 131 Kan. 651, 293 Pac.
745 (1930); Buckingham Hotel Co. v. Kimberley, 138 Miss. 445, 103 So. 213 (1925); McKee v.
Dodd, 152 Cal. 637, 93 Pac. 854 (19o8); Tyler v. Thompson, 44 Tex. 497 (1875). In re Ktoebe,
28 Ch. D. 175 (1884).
"'Ingersoll v. Coram, 211 U.S. 335 (19o8); Nash v. Benari, 117 Me. 491, 105 Ad. X07 (1918);
Johnson v. McKinnon, 129 Ala. 223, 29 So. 696 (19o); State v. Fulton, 49 S.W. 297 (Tenn. Ch.
App. 1898). Contra, Lomas v. Hilliard, 6o N.H. 148 (i88o); Goodall v. Marshall, 14 N.H. I61
(1843).
.. See note i5o supra.
"5 See Note, Possibilities of a Claimant Barred by Nonclaim Statute of Domiciliary Jurisdiction
Recovering Against an Ancillary Adminstrator, 41 IowA. L. REv. 271, 273 (1956).
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are permitted to receive a prorated share of the assets located in all states0lt Like-
wise, it seems clear that nonresident creditors must be given priority equal to that of
residents in insolvent estates..54  This latter limitation may rest on rights under
the United States Constitution and, therefore, not apply to certain international
estates. It has been stated, for example, that the ancillary administrator may dis-
tribute locally if the assets would be subjected to claims by the domicile not recog-
nized at the forum.'55
The possibility of preventative action in this area of conflicts depends to a great
extent upon the persuasive ability of the personal representative. If ancillary ad-
ministration is to be avoided, it is often necessary to persuade creditors to refrain
from requiring local administration and to look to a foreign administration for pay-
ment. This and related tasks are made more difficult by the fact that the personal
representative usually must wait until the nonclaim period at the domicile has ex-
pired before he can safely pay any creditor.5 6 If, however, ancillary administration
can be avoided, the possibility of conflicting or harassing litigation with creditors can
be reduced by reducing the possible fora. If any possibility of insolvency exists,
the personal representative should postpone distribution until the nonclaim period
in all administrations has expired before distributing the prorated dividend to the
creditors.
A problem sometimes confused with claims against an estate is the matter of a
claim against the personal representative. Causes of action by or against a personal
representative for acts or transactions occurring since his appointment are personal
to him and unaffected by problems of privity between administrations or limitations
upon suits by foreign fiduciaries. 57 In these cases, the personal representative can
sue or be sued as an individual subject to his duty to account.
E. Nonbarrable Interests and Exempt Assets
Often related to the problem of what assets are available for payment of creditor's
claims are matters relating to the statutory or common-law provisions for benefit of
the family or particular members thereof. Some of the problems incident to dower
and forced shares have been discussed above, but one or two remain for consideration
here.' 8 Many states provide that certain assets of the decedent and certain family
...See, e.g., In re Hirsch's Estate, 146 Ohio St. 393, 66 N.E.2d 636 (946); Estate of Hanreddy, 176
Wis. 5o, x86 N.W. 744 (1922); Ramsay v. Ramsay, 196 II1. r7g, 63 N.E. 618 (1902); Goodall v.
Marshall, ii N.H. 88 (1840).
... See Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898).
.. See In re Lorillard, [1922] 2 Ch. 638 (C.A.); Lawrence v. Kitteridge, 21 Conn. 577 (z852).
See also WOLFF, op. cit. supra note i, at 604.
... Cf . COLO. REv. STAT. § 152-6-3 (1953), requiring administration within a year to charge local
property with debts. See also NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-224 (1943).
... See Turner v. Alton Banking and Trust Co., i66 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1948); Hare v. O'Brien, 233
Pa. 330, 82 At. 475 (19x2); Moore v. Kraft, 179 Fed. 685 (7 th Cir. 1912); Gleason v. Northwestern
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 189 N.Y. xoo, 81 N.E. 777 (1907); Traflet v. Empire Life Ins. Co., 64 N.J.L. 387,
46 At. 204 (1900).
... See discussion at note 35 supra.
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interests shall be free of the claims of creditors. 59 Priorities and exemptions are
generally regarded as matters to be determined by the forum's local law. 60  Because
homestead exemptions require the acquisition of a local home by the deceased before
becoming effective, this particular family interest usually is of concern only in the
domiciliary administration.""'
The family allowance cases indicate quite varied approaches to choice of law, with
some states permitting allowances in ancillary administration, although most indicate
that the matter is one to be considered at the domicile.'62 Clearly, the domicile has
the primary interest, and the personal representative should advise the widow to
make her claim there. If it is necessary, because of the location of assets, to obtain
a family allowance away from the domicile, the personal representative may well be
advised to restrict the amount to that allowed at the domicile, if it be the lesser
amount' 63 This is a matter which could well be called to the testator's attention
so that insurance or some other device can be set up to carry the family over the
period of administration until distribution of the beneficiaries' shares.
F. Apportionment of Federal Estate Taxes
One of the more difficult problems of administration of large estates in the
United States is caused by the imposition of federal taxes and their proration by
state statutes among various beneficiaries. The common-law solution to the distri-
bution of the burden of estate taxes was to pay them from the residue of the probate
estate. This rule has been changed by decision or statute in half of the states to
provide that such taxes shall be apportioned among the recipients of the assets
making up the estate for tax purposes' 64 As far as testamentary gifts are concerned,
there have been few decided cases. It may perhaps be expected that many courts
will, when faced with the problem, apply the law of the decedent's domicile to
determine apportionment as to movables, and the law of the situs as to im-
"5 E.g., as to dower or forced share, see FLA. STAr. § 731.34 (x953); IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-202
(Burns 1953); Thompson v. Union and Mercantile Trust Co., 164 Ark. 411, 262 S.W. 324 (1924);
i AmEmCAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 5.42 (1952); as to family allowances, see ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-2501
(Supp. i953); COLO. REv. STAT. § 152-12-16 (1953); IDAIHo CODE ANN. § 15-504 (1947); KAN. GEN.
STAT. § 59-403 (1949); as to personal and household effects, see ALA. CODE it. 7, § 664 (1940); IOWA
CODE § 635.7 (954); KAN. GEN. STAT. § 59-403 (1949); MINN. STAT. § 525.15 (1953); as to home-
stead, see ALA. CODE it. 7, § 66i (Supp. 1953); CAL. PROB. CODE § 66o (1949); FLA. CON ST. art.
X, § 1; MINN. STAT. § 525.39 (1953).
IGO See, e.g., Jaeglin v. Moakley, 236 Mo. App. 254, 151 S.W.2d 524 (941); Sanders v. Armour
Fertilizer Works, 292 U.S. 190 ('934); ci. Henderson v. Usher, 125 Fla. 709, 170 So. 846 (936).
.. See In re Graham's Estate, 73 Ariz. 179, 239 P.2d 365 (i95i); Matthews v. Matthews, 249 Ala.
6x, 32 So.2d 514 (I947); S. D. Scott & Co. v. Jones, 230 N.C. 74, 52 S.E.2d 219 (I949); Collins v.
Collins, i5o Fla. 374, 7 So.2d 443 (1942); Leonetti v. Tolton, 264 Mich. 618, 25o N.W. 512 (1933).
... See Scoles, supra note 64, at X72.
"'See id. at x8o.
" See, e.g,, Henderson v. Usher, 125 Fla. 709, 170 So. 846 (1936); Regents of the University
System v. Trust Co., 194 Ga. 255, 21 S.E.2d 691 (1942); Louisville Trust Co. v. Walter, 3o6 Ky. 756,
207 S.W.2d 328 (948); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 63-150 (1947): CAL. PROB. CODE §§970-77 ('949);
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 2075-81 (i949); N. J. STAT. ANN. §§ 3 A: 25-30-38 (1951); N. Y. DEc. EsT.
LAw § 124; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2o, §§ 881-87 (Supp. 1955). See generally Scoles, Apportionment ol
Federal Estate Taxes and Conflict of Laws, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 261 (1955).
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movables.'65 Nearly all the litigation has been in New York, whose courts con-
sistently have applied the law of the decedent's domicile in all cases to determine
apportionment.1 6 Inter vivos transfers may also be required to bear a share of the
tax. Of the three jurisdictions that have considered the conflicts problem of ap-
portionment against inter vivos trusts, Minnesota and Massachusetts have applied
the law of the place of the creation and administration of the trust, and New York
has applied the law of the decedent's domicile at death.1
0 7
Because he must pay the tax and enforce contribution if apportionment is re-
quired, the domiciliary personal representative is most concerned with this problem.
He may use his full power of retention and set off to enforce contribution, and he
may sue to enforce contribution' 8 Here, again, sympathetic personal representa-
tives of the different administrations are needed to negotiate effective apportionment.
Fortunately, this is a matter subject both to the decedent's intention and to control
by the draftsman. Every dispositive instrument should have an express provision
stating the wishes of the testator with regard to apportionment of estate taxes. If
the taxes are to be paid from the residue, this should be stated. If the testator
desires to apportion the tax, this should be stated by indicating which gifts are to
contribute and which, if any, are not. Of particular concern are inter vivos dis-
positions; as to these, the intention of the testator should be indicated in both the
will and the inter vivos instrument to assure the result without regard to the conflicts
attitude of the courts which might later pass on the question.'
G. Distribution
Many of the local-law peculiarities that distort the testamentary scheme may be
remedied or at least alleviated by judicious handling of distribution. Distribution
of immovables is made at the situs, while distribution of movables is usually made
at the principal place of administration, which, under Anglo-American law, is the
domicile at death17 Distribution of movables may be made in ancillary admin-
101 Cf. Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95 (1942).
1'in re Peabody's Estate, 115 N.Y.S.2d 337 (Sup. Ct. 1952); In re Ruperti's Estate, x94 Misc. 376,
86 N.Y.S.2d 887 (Surr. Ct. 1949); In re Bernie's Estate, 74 N.Y.S.2d 887 (Surr. Ct. 1947); Goodman's
Estate, 76 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Surr. Ct. 1946); In re Dommerich's Estate, 74 N.Y.S.2d 283 (Surr. Ct.
1945).
10 First Nat'l Bank v. First Trust Co., 242 Minn. 226, 64 N.W.2d 524 (1954); Isaacson v. Boston
Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 325 Mass. 469, 91 N.E.2d 334 (1950); In re Gato's Estate, 276 App. Div. 651,
97 N.Y.S.2d 171 (ist Dep't 1950). See also Knowles v. National Bank of Detroit, 76 N.W.2d 813
(Mich. 1956).
10. See In re Peabody's Estate, 115 N.Y.S.2d 337 (Sup. Ct. 1952); In re Gato's Estate, supra note 167;
Central Hanover Bank v. Peabody, 19o Misc. 66, 68 N.Y.S.2d 256 (Sup. Ct. 1947); cl. Matter of Buck-
man, 270 App. Div. 707, 62 N.Y.S.2d 337 (ist Dep't, 1946). See also note 164 supra.
..9 The attitude of Massachusetts, Isaacson v. Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 325 Mass. 469,
91 N.E.2d 334 (1950), and Minnesota, First Nat'l Bank v. First Trust Co., 242 Minn. 226, 64 N.W.2d
524 (1954), is that apportionment against the inter vivos trust is governed by the law applicable
to the trust and that the domicile of the settlor at death is without jurisdiction to impose the obliga-
tion. Consequently, provision in both instruments would seem to overcome the possible invalidating
effects of this approach.
17. See GoODRICH, op. cit. supra note I, at 576; Ky. RE,. STAT. § 395.26o (1953); ME. REV. STA'r.
c. x56, § 32 (1954).
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istration if some policy of the forum would be offended by the proposed distribu-
tion of the principal administration.' 7' Examples are undue taxes, limitation on
charitable gifts,172 or even payment to creditors or claimants whose claims are not
recognized in the other jurisdiction 73 If there are substantial assets at the dom-
icile or any other chosen forum which will accede to the testator's wishes, this
forum can retaliate against foreign distribution by adjusting its own distribution
to offset that of another administration. In cases of elections against the will in one
jurisdiction and taking under it in another, this method of retaliation is often used
to restore, as far as available assets permit, what the forum believes to be the pre-
ferred testamentary scheme. While perhaps sometimes used to enforce provincial
attitudes by an ancillary forum, this is a useful device for the domicile, as the
jurisdiction most intimately interested in the decedent, his estate, and family, to give
effect to the testator's plans in light of the domicile's prevailing policy.'74 This
suggests that wherever possible, the principal administration should be the last to
distribute and that the principal personal representative guide himself by the dom-
iciliary law in determining questions of elections and adjustment of foreign distri-
bution. The distribution control is, of course, more effective if there are substantial
amounts available for distribution at the domicile.
Distribution to foreign fiduciaries under terms of testamentary trusts or life
estates or gifts to minors may also well raise important conflicts problems. In all
such cases, the distributing fiduciary must require qualification under the various laws
having contact. Extreme caution must be exercised in assuming that the concept
of the fiduciaries' duties and beneficiaries' rights, as understood in Anglo-American
law, can efficiently be transferred to the system of another country. Both the effect
of the gift and the transfer to a foreign fiduciary, as well as the latter's qualifications,
must be thoroughly explored by the draftsman and the advisor of the distributing
fiduciary.' 7  Quite often, a trust arrangement, with administration in a familiar
forum, with appropriate precaution by way of bond, is better than subjecting the
assets to the uncertainty of an unfamiliar foreign concept.1'7
V
CONCLUSION
As in most areas of preventive law, the best way to avoid conflict-of-laws prob-
lems in succession is to have the estate owner's assets and estate plans so arranged
17' See Lawrence v. Kitteridge, 21 Conn. 577 (1852).
7-2 See Matter of Beresford's Estate, r46 Misc. 140, 262 N.Y. Supp. 78 (Surr. Ct. 1932); Graveley v.
Graveley, 25 S.C. 1 (1885); Matter of Hughes, 95 N.Y. 55 (1884); cf. In re Lawrence's Will, 93
Vt. 424, io8 At. 387 (1919).
.. in re Lorillard, [1922] a Ch. 638 (C.A.); cf. Caruso v. Caruso, to6 N.J. Eq. I3o, 148 At.
882 (Ct. Err. & App. 1930).
"' See Griley v. Griley, 43 So.ad 350 (Fla. 1949); Murphy v. Murphy, 125 Fla. 855, 170 So. 856
(1936); In re Lawrence's Estate, 93 Vt. 424, io8 Ad. 387 (1919); Cummings' Estate, 153 Pa. 397, 25
At. 125 (1893); Van Dyke's Appeal, 6o Pa. 481 (1869). See also Scoles, Conflict of Laws and Elections
in Administration of Decedents" Estates, 30 IND. L. J. 293, 308 (1955).
" See WOLFF, op. cit. supra note 1, at 591.
170 See discussion at notes 77 and 87 supra.
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that they do not arise. This is, of course, much easier to say than to do, as few
clients are willing to so limit their affairs as to conform to what an attorney might
suggest in order to assure a most favorable post-mortem factual situation. Neverthe-
less, so far as the interests of the client permit, the simplest solution to any potential
conflict-of-laws problem is to prevent any "conflict" from occurring. Consequently,
an effective approach in this area is first to locate assets in states with internal law
or conflict-of-laws rules sympathetic to the control desired by the testator; second,
to satisfy the internal law requirements of jurisdictions having the controlling
contacts with the estate; third, to use express clauses indicating the intention of
the estate owner in matters subject to his intent; fourth, to include express choice-
of-law clauses in the estate instruments; and finally, and perhaps most important, to
impress upon the client the necessity of periodic review of his entire dispositive
scheme in order to assure the accommodation of changed circumstances that would
otherwise distort his planned distribution.
